





UNIVERSITY OF TRENTO 
 




DOCTORAL SCHOOL IN 
PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCES AND EDUCATION 
 
Doctoral Dissertation  in the subject of Cognitive Sciences 
 
 
The two core systems of numerical cognition 




Professor Luca Surian 
 
Co-advisor: 
Professor Manuela Piazza 
PhD candidate: 













































































buying	 something	at	 the	market,	 interpreting	a	graph,	 looking	at	 the	 clock	and	
calculating	how	many	minutes	 to	 go	 for	 a	meeting.	 These	 operations	 are	 done	
automatically	and	almost	without	awareness.		
But	how	do	we	acquire	this	knowledge?	How	do	children	learn	such	basic	
mathematical	 abilities?	 How	 do	 they	 make	 sense	 of	 numbers?	 Is	 the	 sense	 of	
number	 innate	 or	 acquired?	Why	do	 some	 children	 present	 difficulties	 only	 in	
the	mathematical	domain	and	not	in	other	areas?		
One	of	the	most	basic	numerical	skill	that	humans	display	early	in	life	and	
that	 they	 share	 with	 most	 non-human	 animals,	 with	 no	 need	 for	 language	 or	
formal	 instruction,	 is	 the	 ability	 to	quantify	 sets	on	 the	basis	of	 the	number	of	
objects	 they	contain.	 It	has	been	recently	 suggested	 that	 there	are	 two	distinct	
systems	 at	 the	 basis	 of	 this	 intuitive	 quantification	 skill:	 that	 of	 approximate	
number	 estimation	 and	 that	 of	 precise	 number	 quantification	 (Feigenson,	
Dehaene,	&	Spelke,	2004;	Burr	et	al.,	2010;	Hyde,	2011;	Piazza,	2010;	Piazza	et	
al.,	 2011;	 Cutini,	 Scatturin,	 Moro,	 &	 Zorzi,	 2014).	 These	 two	 systems	 are	
respectively	 defined	 as	 Approximate	 Number	 System	 or	 ANS	 (Halberda	 et	 al.,	
2008;	 Dehaene,	 1997)	 and	 Subitizing,	 or	 Object	 Tracking	 System,	 OTS	 (Piazza	












present	 very	 early	 in	 development	 (e.g.	 Izard,	 Sann,	 Spelke,	 &	 Streri,	 2009),	
shared	 with	 non-human	 species	 (e.g.	 Brannon	 &	 Terrace,	 1998;	 Cantlon	 &	
Brannon,	2006;	Feigenson,	Dehaene,	&	Spelke,	2004;	Gelman	&	Gallistel,	 2004;	
Nieder,	Freedman,	&	Miller,	2002;	Nieder	&	Miller,	2003;	Rugani	et	al.,	2007)	and	
active	 in	 individuals	 from	 cultures	 with	 a	 limited	 counting	 system	 (e.g.	 Pica,	
Lemer,	 Izard,	 &	 Dehaene,	 2004).	 Furthermore,	 the	 ANS	 increases	 in	 precision	
during	the	 life-span,	and	 it	 is	ratio-dependent:	 the	capacity	to	discriminate	two	
arrays	of	different	numerosities	depends	on	their	ratio.	In	the	case	of	high	ratios	
(i.e.	 1:2	 ratio)	 it	 is	 easy	 for	 adults	 to	 discriminate	 the	 difference	 between	 two	
numerosities	 and	 to	 judge	which	 one	 contains	more	 dots,	while	 in	 the	 case	 of	
small	ratios	the	task	becomes	more	difficult	(for	example	7:8	ratio).	The	minimal	
discriminable	difference	can	be	described	 in	 terms	of	Weber	 fraction	 (w).	 	The	
Weber	 fraction	 is	 the	 difference	 between	 the	 two	 closer	 discriminable	
numerosities	normalized	by	the	magnitude	of	 the	smallest	one.	Performance	 in	
comparison	 or	 in	 discrimination	 of	 dot	 patterns	 (or	 sequences	 of	 visual	 or	
auditory	objects)	can	also	be	 fitted	with	psychophysical	 functions,	where	a	key	







reflecting	 the	 precision	 of	 the	 internal	 representation	 of	 estimated	 numerical	
magnitude.	The	weber	 fraction	 can	 also	be	 estimated	using	 this	 approach.	The	
weber	 fraction	 is	 an	 inverse	 index	 of	 precision:	 better	 performances	 in	 dots	
comparison/matching	 task	 (where	 you	 have	 to	 choose	 which	 one	 of	 the	 two	
arrays	contains	more	dots,	or	to	evaluate	the	numerical	equivalence	across	sets)	
corresponds	to	a	lower	Weber	fraction	and	vice	versa.		
Recent	 research	 focused	 on	 the	 development	 of	 ANS	 and	 found	 its	
activation	 from	 the	 first	 hours	 of	 life	 (Izard	 et	 al.,	 2009).	Newborns	were	 first	
familiarized	with	fixed	number	of	sequences	of	4	or	12	syllables	(see	Fig.	1),	and	
then	were	 shown	 images	 that	 could	either	match	with	 the	number	of	 syllables	
heard	or	not.	Infants	looked	significantly	longer	at	the	image	that	was	congruent	
with	 the	 auditory	 sequence	 compared	 to	 the	 incongruent	 image.	 The	 authors	
found	this	preference	only	for	a	numerical	ratio	of	1:3,	but	not	for	a	ratio	of	1:2.	
Using	 this	 inter-modal	 paradigm,	 they	 provided	 evidence	 for	 a	 numerical	
discrimination	that	emerges	for	a	ratio	of	1:3	but	not	for	closer	ratios.		
	
          
	







The	 ANS	 acuity	 (the	 ability	 to	 perceive	 the	 difference	 between	 two	
numerosities)	 improves	 very	 quickly	 in	 the	 first	months	 of	 life.	 Xu	 and	 Spelke	
(2000),	 using	 the	 habituation	 paradigm,	 observed	 that	 6-month-old	 infants	










More	 recently,	 some	 authors	 reported	 a	 phenomenon	 defined	 as	
“hysteresis”	(Odic,	Hock,	&	Halberda,	2014;	Wang,	Odic,	Halberda,	&	Feigenson,	
2016),	where	this	normally	thought	fixed	ratio-dependent	acuity	can	actually	be	
rapidly	 improved.	 In	 one	 study	 (Wang,	 Libertus,	 &	 Feigenson,	 2018,	 Fig.	 2)	 6-
months-old	 infants	 were	 trained	 with	 10	 trials	 in	 the	 following	 sequence	 of	
ratios	 1:6,	 1:3,	 1:2,	 3:5,	 3:4,	 observing	 a	 progression	 on	 difficulty.	 After	 the	
training	trials,	participants	were	presented	with	two	test	trials	only	with	the	2:3	
















study	 (Libertus,	 Feigenson,	 &	 Halberda,	 2013)	 the	 authors	 assessed	 the	 ANS	
acuity,	math	 ability	 and	 expressive	 vocabulary	 of	 preschool-aged	 children	 in	 a	
longitudinal	 study.	They	 found	 that	 early	ANS	acuity	predicted	performance	 in	
math	six	months	 later	and	 this	ability	was	 the	only	predictor	above	expressive	
vocabulary,	attention	and	memory	span.	
Another	study	investigated	this	relation.	Mazzocco	and	colleagues	(2011)	
observed	 ANS	 precision	 in	 3/4	 year-old	 children	 with	 a	 non-symbolic	
comparison	task;	then	they	measured	the	same	mathematical	abilities	after	two	
years.	 The	 results	 showed	 that	 the	 ANS	 precision	 of	 3/4-year-old	 children	
predicted	their	school	mathematics	performance	at	6	years	old.	All	these	findings	
demonstrated	 the	 tight	 correlation	 between	 ANS	 acuity	 and	 further	
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mathematical	 abilities.	 Other	 studies	 found	 similar	 results	 in	 high	 school	
students	(Halberda,	Mazzocco,	&	Feigenson,	2008),	in	college	students	(Libertus,	
Odic,	 &	 Halberda,	 2012)	 and	 in	 gifted	 adolescents	 (Wang	 et	 al.,	 2017).	
Complementary	 lines	 of	 research	 have	 also	 demonstrated	 improvements	 in	
arithmetic	performances	with	ANS	specific	trainings	in	college	students	(Park	&	
Brannon,	2013,	2014)	and	 in	pre-schoolers	 (Park	et	 al.,	 2016).	However,	 other	
authors	 tested	 3-to-4-year-old	 children	 with	 7	 months	 of	 interval	 in	 a	
numerosity	 comparison	 task,	 counting	 task,	 give	 a	 number	 task	 and	 symbolic	
battery	 and	 they	 provided	 evidence	 for	 a	 predictive	 role	 of	 cardinality	
proficiency	 and	 symbolic	 number	 knowledge	 on	 accuracy	 in	 number	
comparison.	 Therefore,	 the	 direction	 of	 the	 link	 between	 ANS	 acuity	 and	
symbolic	 skills	 does	 not	 appear	 so	 clear	 (for	 a	 review	 of	 this	 relationship:	
Feigenson,	Libertus,	&	Halberda,	2013).		
Moreover,	most	 longitudinal	studies	 (that	are	key	 in	demonstrating	 that	
the	 ANS	 is	 foundational	 for	 subsequent	 language-based	 math	 skills)	 have	
measured	 the	 ANS	 in	 children	 having	 already	 approached	 some	 form	 of	
mathematical	 education,	 for	 example	 having	 learnt	 the	 verbal	 counting	
principles:	 it	 is	 therefore	difficult	 to	 systematically	discern	 the	direction	of	 the	




To	 my	 knowledge,	 only	 one	 study	 has	 assessed	 this	 relation	 with	 a	




the	 precision	 of	 preverbal	 number	 sense	 in	 the	 first	 year	 of	 life	 predicts	 later	
mathematical	abilities.	They	used	a	change	detection	paradigm	to	examine	ANS	
acuity:	 newborns	 of	 6	 months	 observed	 two	 streams	 of	 different	 arrays	
presented	 on	 different	monitors	 on	 the	 left	 and	 on	 the	 right	 of	 the	 infant,	 one	
screen	 showed	 images	 that	 change	 in	 numerical	 values	while	 the	 other	 stayed	
numerically	fixed	and	changed	only	in	dot	size	and	arrangement.	At	3.5	years	of	
age	the	children	were	again	assessed	in	numerical	and	mathematical	capacities.	
The	 results	 demonstrated	 that	 ANS	 acuity	 at	 6	months	 of	 age	 is	 predictive	 of	
math	achievement,	number	word	knowledge	and	numerical	acuity	at	3.5	years	of	
age.		
However,	 the	 size	of	 the	 correlation	was	 small	 and	 the	numerical	 ratios	
used	 to	 estimate	 the	ANS	 acuity	 at	T1	differed	 from	child	 to	 child	 (some	were	
presented	with	ratios	of	1:4,	others	1:3,	or	1:2),	leaving	open	the	possibility	that	





and	 math,	 some	 researchers	 have	 failed	 to	 find	 significant	 correlations	 (e.g.	
Holloway,	&	Ansari,	2009).	Other	authors	(Gilmore	et	al.,	2013)	speculated	that	
the	 correlation	 actually	 reflects	 the	 capacity	 to	 inhibit	 other	 non-numerical	
factors	such	as	the	total	area	occupied.	There	is	therefore	a	 lack	in	this	domain	










Association,	 2013)	 individuals	 with	 DD	 present	 specific	 impairments	 in	
processing	 numerical	 information	 and	 learning	 arithmetic	 facts	 and	 the	
prevalence	 is	 estimated	 from	5%	 to	15%	 in	 the	 school-aged	population.	These	
percentages	 support	 the	 importance	 and	 the	 necessity	 of	 making	 progress	 in	
understanding	DD.	 Indeed,	 the	 core	 deficits	 causing	 this	 learning	 disorder	 still	
remain	 unclear	 and	 the	 literature	 is	 composed	 by	 various	 and	 often	
contradictory	observations.	One	line	of	research	proposed	that	one	of	the	causes	
of	DD	is	a	deficit	in	ANS	acuity.	Piazza	and	colleagues	(2010)	found,	for	the	first	
time,	 a	 strong	 association	 between	 dyscalculia	 and	 ANS	 acuity.	 In	 this	 study,	
dyscalculic	children	of	ten	years	of	age	were	tested	with	a	standardized	battery	
probing	 knowledge	 of	 symbolic	 number,	 a	 calculation	 task	 and	 with	 a	 dots	
comparison	task	(children	were	asked	to	 indicate	which	of	two	arrays	contains	
more	 dots).	 The	 results	 demonstrated	 that	 numerical	 acuity	 was	 severely	














or	 inappropriate	 arithmetic	 strategies	 are	 not	 inhibited	 in	 favour	 of	 more	
appropriate	ones	(Gilmore	et	al.,	2013).	Szucs	and	colleagues	(2013)	compared	
five	different	theories	of	dyscalculia	(magnitude	representation,	WM,	inhibition,	
attention	 and	 spatial	 processing)	 in	 9-10	 year-old	 children	 of	 primary	 school.	
They	 supported	 the	 idea	 that	 visuo-spatial	 STM	 and	 WM	 with	 inhibition	
impairments	 are	 the	most	 relevant	 dysfunctions	 in	DD.	 Inhibition	 impairment,	
for	 these	 authors,	 is	 related	 to	 the	 disruption	 of	 central	 executive	 memory	
function.	According	to	 them,	DD	should	be	characterized	by	a	specific	deficit	 in	
visuo-spatial	 STM	 and	 by	 a	 specific	 inhibition	 impairment	 relevant	 to	 visuo-
spatial	 central	 executive	 memory	 function,	 resulting	 in	 poor	 WM.	 This	
complicated	 scenario	 is	 also	 connected	 with	 the	 heterogeneity	 of	 DD.	 For	
instance,	 Kaufmann	 and	 colleagues	 (2013)	 support	 the	 idea	 of	 DD	 as	 a	
heterogeneous	 disorder,	 resulting	 from	 individual	 differences	 that	 occur	 in	
multiple	levels	(such	as	neuroanatomical,	neuropsychological,	behavioural	etc.).	
In	 line	 with	 these	 authors	 multiple	 deficits	 can	 co-occur	 in	 DD	 and	 the	
heterogeneity	could	not	be	explained	by	a	single	core	deficit.		
	 All	these	studies	show	how	this	topic	is	still	debated.	Contrasting	findings	














Another	 component	 of	 early	 numerical	 abilities	 is	 the	 Object	 Tracking	 System	
(OTS).	The	OTS	is	a	mechanism	for	representing	multiple	objects	in	parallel,	and	
it	 is	 a	 capacity	 limited	 system	 which	 underlies	 many	 aspects	 of	 perception,	
including	 not	 only	 numerical	 tasks,	 but	 also	 visuo-spatial	 attention	 and	 WM	
(Alvarez	&	Cavanagh	2004;	Luck	&	Vogel,	1997).	This	system	allows	tracking	a	
limited	number	of	objects	 in	space	and	 time	and	 it	 seems	to	reach	maturity	by	
the	 first	 year	 of	 life	 (Revkin	 et	 al.,	 2008;	 Ross-Sheehy	 et	 al.,	 2003;	 Rose	 et	 al.,	
2001;	Vogel	&	Machizawa,	2004).	
However,	 at	 its	 maximum	 development	 this	 capacity	 is	 limited	 to	 3-4	






reached	 one	 bucket	 or	 the	 other.	 Using	 the	 manual	 search	 technique	 these	
results	were	confirmed	also	in	14	month-old	infants	(Feigenson	&	Carey,	2003).	
Infants	 can	 therefore	 discriminate	 sets	 of	 objects	 up	 to	 3	 and	 the	OTS	 doesn’t	






Further	 evidence	 is	 provided	 by	 studies	 assessing	 the	 memory	 span	
capacity	and	the	subitizing.	Regarding	the	former	aspect,	studies	of	adults	found	
that	 the	 capacity	 to	 individuate	multiple	 items	 is	 limited	 to	 3-4	 items	 and	 the	
performances	decreased	systematically	with	more	than	3-4	objects	at	a	time	(e.g.	
Luck	&	Vogel,	 1997).	 For	 infants	 a	 crucial	moment	of	 improvement	 is	 outlined	
between	5	and	12	months,	where	they	quickly	developed	span	capacities	(for	a	
review	 see	 Reynolds	 &	 Romano,	 2016;	 Ross-Sheehy	 et	 al.,	 2003;	 Rose	 et	 al.,	
2001).	 A	 paradigm	 used	 to	 assess	 the	 visual	 STM	 in	 infancy	 is	 the	 change	
detection	paradigm:	participants	observed	two	sets	of	stimuli,	presented	on	the	
right	and	on	the	 left,	one	of	 them	changes	at	each	presentation	while	the	other	
remains	 constant.	 For	 example,	 in	 assessing	 WM	 span	 of	 three	 objects,	 one	
monitor	 always	 shows	 three	 squares	 with	 the	 same	 colors,	 while	 the	 other	
presents	three	squares	but	one	of	them	changes	color	at	each	new	presentation.	
The	hypothesis	behind	 this	paradigm	 is	 that	 infants	would	prefer	 the	changing	
set	when	it	remains	under	the	limit	of	their	WM	span.	When	the	set	size	exceeds	
this	 limit,	 infants	 shouldn’t	 manifest	 a	 preference.	 Using	 this	 paradigm,	 Ross-
Sheehy	and	colleagues	systematically	assessed	memory	span	 in	 infants	 from	4-	
to	13-	month-old.	Findings	revealed	a	span	of	1	in	4-	and	6.5-month-old	infants,	
while	10-	and	13-month-old	infants	showed	a	span	of	3.	Moreover,	when	tested	
with	 4	 objects	 at	 a	 time,	 infants	 of	 10	 months	 old	 preferred	 to	 look	 at	 the	
changing	 stream.	 These	 results	 lead	 to	 important	 assumptions.	 First	 of	 all,	
infants’	memory	span	develops	very	quickly,	starting	from	one	item	and	reaching	




Unlike	 the	 ANS,	 which	 continues	 to	 develop	 until	 adulthood,	 the	 OTS	 grows	
exponentially	 in	 the	 first	 year	 of	 life	 and	 then	 stops	 until	 adulthood	 (see	 also	
Cutini	 et	 al.,	 2014;	 vanMarle	 et	 al.,	 2018).	More	 recently,	 some	 authors	 (Ross-
Sheehy	et	al.,	2011)	found	an	enhancement	of	WM	span	in	10	month-olds	when	
providing	spatial	cues	and	in	5	month-olds	with	motion	cues.		
A	 parallel	 line	 of	 research	 found	 convergent	 results	 indicating	 capacity	
limited	 numerical	 processing	 in	 adults.	 These	 studies	 evaluated	 the	 subitizing	
capacity,	i.e.	the	rapid	naming	of	the	exact	number	of	the	presented	objects.	The	
OTS	is	supposed	to	be	at	the	base	of	the	ability	to	perceive	the	precise	quantity	of	
small	 sets	 (from	 1	 up	 to	 3-4	 items).	 For	 example	 Revkin	 et	 al.,	 (2008)	 tested	
participants	 with	 a	 rapid	 naming	 task	 in	 1-8	 and	 10-80	 items.	 The	 findings	
indicated	 more	 precise	 performances	 for	 1-4	 numerosities	 but	 not	 for	 10-40	







are	 the	 relevant	 features	 that	 allow	 it	 to	 discriminate	 multiple	 entities	 as	
different?	On	what	basis	do	 infants	manage	to	count	one,	 two	or	three	objects?	
The	aim	of	the	studies	in	object	individuation	is	exactly	that	of	trying	to	give	an	
answer	 to	 these	 questions	 (e.g.	 Baillargeon	 et	 al.,	 2012;	 Kibbe	 &	 Leslie,	 2011;	
	
	 15	
Wilcox	 &	 Biondi,	 2015;	 Stavans	 &	 Baillargeon,	 2018).	 The	 violation	 of	
expectation	is	usually	used	to	assess	infants’	knowledge:	infants	are	shown	one	
occluder	on	the	scene	and	a	sequence	of	object	emergences	that	conduct	them	to	
create	 expectations	 about	 how	many	 entities	 are	 hidden	 behind	 the	 occluder.	
Then,	 in	 the	 test	 phase	 infants	 observe	 either	 an	 expected	 or	 unexpected	
outcome.		
Using	this	technique,	some	authors	demonstrated	that	infants	can	rely	on	
spatio-temporal	 information	 to	 discriminate	 two	 objects.	 For	 example,	 when	
infants	of	4	months	observed	a	discontinuous	movement2,	they	looked	longer	at	
the	one-object	rather	than	the	two-objects	outcome	(Spelke	et	al.,	1995).	Infants	
have	 early	 access	 to	 spatiotemporal	 information	 to	 perceive	 different	 objects.	
However,	they	find	it	difficult	to	bind	featural	information.	In	a	seminal	study,	Xu	
and	 Carey	 (1996),	 demonstrated	 that	 without	 spatiotemporal	 cues	 infants	 as	
young	as	10	months	 failed	 to	bind	 featural	 information	to	 individuate	different	
objects.	Nevertheless,	 other	 studies	have	 shown	 that	 the	 individuation	process	
might	be	facilitated	by	language	acquisition	(Xu,	2002;	Xu,	Cote,	&	Baker,	2005).	
For	example,	12-month-olds	 can	succeed	 in	a	 searching	manual	 task,	using	 the	
number	of	 labels	pronounced	by	the	experimenter	to	determine	the	number	of	
objects	hidden	in	a	box.	












showed	 the	 violation	 of	 expectation	 when	 the	 screen	 was	 removed	 revealing	
only	 one	 object;	 but	 when	 no	 ostensive	 signals	 or	 no	 distinct	 functions	 were	




assign	 different	 categories	 on	 the	 base	 of	 human-like	 or	 non-human-like	
information	without	linguistic	cues	or	functional	demonstrations	(Bonatti	et	al.,	
2002,	 2005;	 Surian	 &	 Caldi,	 2010).	 These	 studies	 are	 the	 only	 ones	 to	 have	
investigated	 the	 role	of	 “human”	and	 “dynamic”	 (in	 terms	of	 “agent”	vs.	 “inert”	

















(for	 inverse	 efficiency	 scores)	 of	 the	 subitizing	 range	 in	 dyscalculics	 than	 in	
controls.		
	 In	 another	 experiment	 (Schleifer	 &	 Landerl,	 2011),	 enumeration	 skills	
were	 tested	 in	dyscalculic	 children	and	 in	 controls	matched	 for	 age,	 IQ,	 visual-
STM,	 attention	 and	 response	 speed.	 Dyscalculics	 displayed	 steeper	 reaction	
times	(hereafter	RTs)	slopes	in	the	subitizing	range	(1-3),	but	similar	RTs	slopes	
in	the	counting	range	(4-7).	These	results	were	later	replicated	by	Andersson	&	





in	 the	 subitizing	 capacity	 (De	 Smedt	 &	 Gilmore,	 2011;	 Iuculano	 et	 al.,	 2008;	
Landerl,	 Bevan,	 &	 Butterworth,	 2004).	 Recently,	 Ceulemans	 and	 colleagues	
(2014)	 administered	 a	 subitizing	 test	 to	 18	 adolescents	 with	 dyscalculia.	
Comparing	 dyscalculics	 and	 controls,	 they	 did	 not	 find	 significant	 differences	
either	in	accuracy	or	in	reaction	times.		
	 	In	 sum,	 the	 research	 in	 this	 field	 is	 limited	 and	 leads	 to	 divergent	

















CHAPTER	 1:	 I	 report	 the	 results	 obtained	 in	 T1	 of	 a	 longitudinal	 study	
where	 we	 assess	 ANS	 acuity	 in	 12-month-old	 infants	 and	 their	 relation	 with	
parents’	 performances.	 I	 also	 present	 the	 findings	 in	 the	 control	 task	 (face	
perception),	relevant	to	observe	the	dissociation	between	this	ability	and	future	
math’	 acquisition.	 Finally,	 the	 correlations	 between	 infants	 and	 parents	
performances	are	presented.		
CHAPTER	2:	in	this	part	I	present	the	findings	of	three	experiments	where	
we	 test	 the	 role	 of	 motion	 information	 on	 10-month-olds'	 and	 adults'	 object	
individuation	process.	This	allows	discriminating	how	many	objects	are	involved	






































































of	 the	 inter-individual	 differences	 in	 ANS	 acuity	 for	 the	 development	 of	 later	




a	 longitudinal	 relation	 with	 later	 symbolic	 math	 skills	 (Gilmore,	 McCarthy,	 &	
Spelke,	 2010;	 Libertus,	 Feigenson	 &	 Halberda,	 2013;	 Mazzocco	 et	 al.,	 2011).	
However,	other	studies	failed	to	observe	this	relation	(Holloway	&	Ansari,	2009;	
Nosworthy	 et	 al.,	 2013;	 Sasanguie,	 Defever,	 Maertens,	 &	 Reynvoet,	 2014;)	 or	
reported	mixed	 results.	 Bonny	 and	Lourenco	 (2013)	 found	 a	 difference	 in	 this	
association	 that	 emerged	 only	 in	 children	with	 lower	math	 scores.	 In	 another	
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study,	 (Inglis,	 Attridge,	 Batchelor,	 &	 Gilmore,	 2011)	 the	 relation	 between	 ANS	
acuity	and	calculation	was	 found	 in	7-	 to	9-year-old	children	but	not	 in	adults.		
These	mixed	findings	lead	to	the	question	whether	the	ANS	could	be	considered	
a	 predictor	 of	 later	 mathematical	 abilities	 or	 not.	 In	 the	 attempt	 to	 solve	 the	
debate,	 in	a	recent	meta-analysis	Schneider	and	colleagues	 (2017)	 investigated	
the	reliability	of	such	link	between	non-symbolic/symbolic	numerical	acuity	and	
mathematical	 abilities.	 The	 results	 confirmed	 a	 small	 but	 statistically	 reliable	
association	(even	though	symbolic	magnitude	comparison	displayed	a	stronger	









number	sense	acuity	extremely	early,	at	6	months	of	 life,	 in	a	group	of	 infants,	
whom	they	tested	again	when	they	were	3.5	years	old,	using	symbolic	math	tests.	
In	order	 to	examine	 the	ANS	acuity	 in	 the	 first	year	of	 life,	 they	devised	a	new	







math	 achievement	 and	number	word	 knowledge	 at	 3.5	 years	 of	 age.	However,	

































order	 to	 have	 a	 homogeneous	 control	 of	 perceptual	 skills	 outside	 the	 number	
domain,	and	therefore	
4.	 at	 both	 T1	 and	 T2	 we	 will	 measure	 the	 same	 control	 skill	 (face	
perception),	and	this	will	serve	for	inferences	on	the	specificity	and	selectivity	of	
the	relation	between	ANS	and	formal	math	skills.	
To	 address	 the	 question	 of	 this	 relation,	 at	 T1	 we	 administered	 one	
numerical	task	and	one	face	perception	task.	The	latter	is	relevant	to	verify	the	
longitudinal	specificity	of	ANS	as	a	unique	predictor	of	early	symbolic	and	non-
symbolic	 numerical	 achievement.	 The	 aim	 is	 to	 understand	whether	 a	 positive	
correlation	 could	 be	 liable	 to	 differences	 in	 discrimination	 of	 quantities	 or	 to	
more	general	perceptual	abilities.	Positive	correlations	with	both	ANS	and	 face	
perception	 would	 suggest	 that	 mathematical	 abilities	 rely	 more	 on	 general	
perceptual	 processing.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 if	 symbolic	 math	 skills	 selectively	
correlate	 with	 numerical	 acuity,	 this	 would	 give	 further	 support	 to	 the	
hypothesis	of	a	specific	association	between	ANS	and	math	acquisition.		
We	decided	 to	assess	 infants’	 face	processing	because	 it	 is	 considered	a	
separated	ability	from	numerical	cognition,	tapping	on	different	neurocognitive	




Golarai	 et	 al.,	 2007;).	 The	 dorsal	 stream	 is	 mainly	 involved	 in	 processing	
spatial/numerical	 information	 while	 the	 ventral	 stream	 is	 important	 for	
identification	 of	 objects	 and	 face	 recognition.	 For	 example,	 Chinello	 and	
colleagues	 (2013)	 found	distinct	developmental	 trajectories	of	 face	 recognition	
abilities	 within	 the	 ventral	 stream	 on	 one	 side	 and	 numerosity	 comparison	






an	 index	 of	 individual	 differences	 in	 numerical	 acuity.	 Infants	were	 presented	
with	two	arrays	containing	dots,	in	one	of	which	the	numerosity	changed	at	each	
presentation	while	in	the	other	the	numerosity	remained	constant.	We	explored	
infants’	 numerical	 acuity	 using	 multiple	 ratios	 presented	 to	 each	 child:	 we	






month-old	 infants	 were	 familiarized	 first	 with	 highly	 discriminable	 ratios	 and	








features	 and	 configurations	 infants	 rely	 on	 in	 order	 to	 process	 and	 recognize	
different	faces.	Many	authors	proposed	a	distinction	between	featural	processing,	
which	 refers	 to	 the	 sensitivity	 to	 the	 shape	 of	 eyes,	 nose	 and	 mouth,	 and	




relations,	 i.e.	 processing	 the	 distances	 among	 features	 (e.g.	 Mondloch	 et	 al.,	
2002).	Some	authors	provided	evidence	of	more	difficulty	 in	 tasks	 that	require	
sensitivity	 to	 second-order	 changes	 than	 to	 featural	 ones	 (e.g.	 Freire	 &	 Lee,	
2001).	 For	 example,	 Mondloch	 and	 colleagues	 (2002)	 demonstrated	 a	 late	
development	of	configural	process,	in	particular	second-order	relation,	compared	
to	the	featural	one	in	children	aged	6,	8	and	10	years.	However,	only	few	studies	
investigated	 the	 sensitivity	 to	 these	 changes	 during	 infancy	 and	 all	 of	 them	
(Bertin	 &	 Bhatt,	 2004;	 Hayden	 et	 al.,	 2007;	 Thompson	 et	 al.,	 2001)	 tested	 the	
second-order	 change	 detection	 without	 a	 parallel	 assessment	 of	 the	 featural	
change	detection.		
To	our	knowledge,	 only	one	 study	proposed	a	 task	 for	 investigating	 the	
two	 processes	 in	 the	 same	 infants.	 3-4-month-old	 and	 6-7-month-old	 infants	





and	 the	new	 image	 that	could	differ	 in	 the	distance	between	 the	eyes,	distance	
between	 the	 nose	 and	 the	mouth,	 size	 of	 the	 eyes	 and	 size	 of	 the	mouth.	 The	
authors	reported	a	preference	of	the	infants	for	the	novel	image	in	the	cases	of	a	
different	distance	among	eyes,	nose/mouth	and	different	features	in	the	eyes	but	
not	 in	 the	 featural	 change	 of	 the	 mouth.	 Thus,	 the	 sensitivity	 for	 the	 change	
depends	not	only	on	the	featural/second-order	arrangements	but	also	on	the	part	
of	 the	 face	 involved	 in	 the	 task.	 Moreover,	 and	 more	 interestingly	 for	 our	
investigation,	 contrary	 to	 previous	 results	 (e.g.	 Cashon	 &	 Cohen,	 2004)	 the	
authors	 found	 higher	 mean	 percentage	 looking	 time	 for	 the	 novelty	 in	 the	
second-order	change	relative	to	the	featural	one.		
Given	 that	 these	 results	 seem	 to	 contradict	 those	 reported	 above	 (e.g.,	
featural	changes	are	more	easily	perceived	compared	to	second-order	changes),	
it	is	still	unclear	whether	infants	can	better	discriminate	featural	or	second-order	
changes.	 Therefore,	 in	 assessing	 face	 processing	 we	 aimed	 to	 first	 provide	 a	
control	 task	 for	 the	 longitudinal	 study	 and	 in	 parallel	 examine	 (a)	 the	 featural	
and	second-order	process	in	12-month-old	infants	(b)	in	a	within	subject	design	
to	 test	 the	 inter-individual	 differences	 that	 occur	 in	 infancy	 (c)	 using	 children	
faces.	 To	 test	 the	 infants’	 individual	 differences,	 we	 implemented	 the	 same	
paradigm	used	for	assessing	the	infants’	numerical	acuity	(Libertus	&	Brannon,	
2010),	 and	 we	 tested	 them	 with	 two	 levels	 of	 change:	 one	 that	 we	 assumed,	
following	Mondloch	and	colleagues	(2002),	to	be	an	easy	level	(featural	change),	
where	we	 showed	 two	 different	 faces	 in	 the	 changing	 image	 stream,	 and	 one,	
assumed	to	be	a	more	difficult	level,	where	we	changed	the	second-order	features	










SD	 =	 24,4	 days).	 We	 recruited	 this	 sample	 size	 considering	 the	 previous	
longitudinal	 study	 of	 Starr	 and	 colleagues	 (2013)	 where	 the	 authors	 assessed	
sixty-six	infants.	Nine	infants	were	excluded	due	to	fussiness,	cry	or	distraction.	
Parents	 of	 all	 children	 provided	 written	 informed	 consent,	 approved	 by	 the	





To	 assess	 ANS	 acuity	 we	 used	 a	 modified	 version	 of	 the	 change	 detection	
paradigm	(Libertus	&	Brannon,	2010).	Infants	were	on	a	parent	lap	and	in	front	
of	three	different	monitors.	They	observed	two	streams	of	images	of	dots	placed	
on	 the	 left	 and	 on	 the	 right	 of	 a	 central	 black	 screen:	 the	 non-changing	 image	
stream	 showed	 the	 same	 numerosities	 over	 time,	 while	 the	 changing	 image	





1:2	 ratio	 (5	 and	 10	 dots,	 30	 images	 for	 each	 stream).	 An	 attractor	 appeared	
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between	 each	 stream	 of	 images.	 The	 side	 of	 the	 changing	 image	 stream	 was	




In	 the	 face	processing	 task	 (see	Fig.	2)	 infants	were	presented	with	 two	
streams	 of	 images	 of	 faces,	where	 one	 stream	 showed	 the	 same	 identical	 face,	
while	 the	 other	 showed	 two	 alternating	 faces	which	 key	 elements	 (eyes,	 nose,	
and	mouth)	differed	either	in	their	shape	(so	called	 featural	change)	or	 in	their	
relative	 position	 (i.e.,	 the	 distance	 across	 the	 eyes,	 and	distance	 between	 eyes,	
nose,	and	mouth;	so	called	second	order	change).		
Infants	observed	four	streams,	two	streams	of	featural	changes	and	then	


































The	 images	 in	 the	 ANS	 acuity	 task	 were	 composed	 by	 dots	 of	 different	
numerosity.	For	the	1:4	ratio	infants	were	shown	20	and	5	dots	in	the	changing	
image	 stream	 and	 5	 dots	 in	 the	 non-changing	 image	 stream.	 For	 the	 1:2	 ratio,	
infants	observed	10	and	5	dots	in	the	changing	stream	and	5	dots	in	the	constant	






years	old).	Parents	gave	written	consent	 to	use	and	 transform	 the	 images.	The	
children’s	 hair	 was	 put	 up	 using	 an	 elastic	 band	 and	 the	 children	 wore	 no	
external	 objects	 (such	 as	 jewelry	 or	 glasses).	 The	 original	 pictures	 were	
greyscaled,	 cropped	 in	 order	 to	 leave	 only	 the	 oval	 part	 of	 the	 faces	 and	
equalized	in	luminance.	The	female	and	male	faces	had	approximately	the	same	
size	(male	faces:	12.5	cm	wide	and	17.1	cm	high;	female	faces:	12.1	cm	wide	and	
17.6	 cm	 high).	 In	 order	 to	 generate	 the	 stimuli	 for	 the	 second	 order	 change	
condition	 we	 followed	 the	 method	 used	 in	 Mondloch	 and	 colleagues	 (2002):	
starting	from	each	of	the	four	original	faces,	we	generated	four	new	ones	where	
the	 eyes	were	moved	 1.2	 cm	 further	 apart	 and	 the	mouth	was	moved	 1.2	 cm	
further	 down	 compared	 to	 the	 original,	 corresponding	 to	 an	 approximate	 2%	
change	in	spatial	separation	across	the	facial	features.		
Stimuli	for	both	tasks	were	presented	for	500	ms	followed	by	300	ms	of	a	
blank	 image.	 Infants	 sat	 on	 a	 parent’s	 lap	 in	 front	 of	 three	 17-inch	 monitors	




monitors,	 leaving	 visible	 only	 the	 screens.	 On	 the	 middle	 monitor	 a	 small	
webcam	was	also	placed,	oriented	in	the	direction	of	the	infant.	The	webcam	was	
attached	 to	 a	 laptop	 placed	 on	 a	 desk,	 behind	 the	 table	 with	 monitors.	 The	
experimenters	were	hidden	by	a	curtain,	which	was	placed	behind	the	table	with	
the	 screens.	 Parents	were	 instructed	 at	 not	 pointing	 at	 the	 screens.	Moreover,	




attention	 of	 the	 infant	 towards	 one	 screen	 or	 the	 other.	 After	 instructing	 the	





started	 the	 first	 block	with	 the	 changing	 image	 stream	 on	 the	 right,	while	 the	
other	half	started	with	a	changing	image	on	the	left.	







preference	score:	 the	proportion	of	 looking	 time	to	 the	changing	stream	minus	
the	proportion	of	looking	time	to	the	non	non-changing	stream.	Thus,	a	positive	
preference	score	 indicates	that	the	 infant	 looked	longer	at	the	changing	stream	
of	images,	while	a	negative	preference	score	indicates	more	looking	times	to	the	
non-changing	stream.	Before	performing	the	analyses,	we	excluded	infants	that	



































Face	 processing	 task.	 Preliminary	 analyses	 showed	 that	 the	 preference	
scores	were	normally	distribuited	both	 in	 featural	 and	 second-order	 conditions	
(Shapiro-Wilk	 normality	 test,	 featural	 change:	 W=	 .98,	 p=	 .45;	 second-order	
change:	 W=	 .96,	 p=	 .08).	 Infants	 preferred	 more	 the	 changing	 in	 the	 featural	
condition	(M	=	 .18,	SD	=	 .29)	 than	 in	 the	second-order	 condition	(M	=	 .13,	SD	=	









featural	 change,	and	32	 infants	preferred	to	 look	at	 the	changing	stream	in	 the	
second-order	condition.		
To	 assess	 the	 reliability	 of	 our	 measures	 we	 performed	 a	 correlation	
between	 the	 two	 levels	 of	 difficulty.	 This	 revealed	 a	 significant	 relationship	
between	the	preference	scores	in	the	featural	and	in	the	second-order	change	(r		=	
.29,	 p	 <	 .05).	 Importantly,	 we	 also	 computed	 separated	 correlations	 between	
numerical	and	face	perception	preference	scores	for	both	levels	of	difficulty	and	
















month-old	 infants	 observed	 two	 streams	 of	 images,	 one	 of	 them	 changed	 in	
numerosities	 or	 in	 facial	 components	while	 the	 other	 showed	 the	 same	 image	
over	 time.	Moreover,	we	manipulated	 the	 levels	of	difficulty	 for	both	 tasks:	1:4	
ratio	 (5	 and	 20	 dots)/1:2	 ratio	 (5	 and	 10	 dots)	 for	 the	 ANS	 acuity	 task	 and	
featural	 (different	 eyes,	 noise	 and	 mouth)/second-order	 (different	 spaces	
between	 the	 eyes	 and	 between	 the	 eyes	 and	 the	 mouth)	 change	 for	 the	 face	
processing	 task.	 We	 then	 calculated	 for	 each	 participant	 a	 preference	 score	
(proportion	of	looking	time	to	the	changing	minus	proportion	of	looking	time	to	
the	 non-changing)	 that	 could	 be	 positive	 when	 infants	 looked	 longer	 at	 the	
changing	or	negative	when	they	observed	more	the	non-changing	stream.		
In	 the	ANS	 acuity	 task,	 our	 results	 revealed	 higher	 looking	 times	 at	 the	
numerical	 changing	 in	 both	 ratios.	 These	 findings	 are	 in	 line	 with	 previous	
studies,	confirming	that	infants	in	the	first	year	of	life	develop	an	ANS	acuity	that	










difficulty	 in	 the	 paradigm.	 Indeed,	 in	 a	 previous	 study,	 Libertus	 and	 Brannon	
have	assessed	 infants	 at	6	months	of	 age	using	 the	 change	detection	paradigm	
with	 trials	 of	 60	 seconds	 for	 a	 total	 of	 4	 trials	 for	 each	 infant.	 The	 same	
participants	were	then	tested	again	at	9	months.	6-month-old	infants,	who	had	a	
strong	preference	for	the	changing,	more	likely	preferred	to	look	at	the	changing	
also	 at	 9	 months.	 They	 provided	 therefore	 evidence	 for	 inter-individual	
differences	that	are	stable	in	the	first	year	of	life.		
In	 our	 study	 we	 failed	 to	 replicate	 such	 results.	 Infants	 who	 observed	
more	 the	 changing	 in	 the	 1:4	 ratio	 were	 not	 the	 same	 infants	 who	 had	 high	
positive	 preference	 scores	 in	 the	 1:2	 ratio.	 There	 are	 two	 possible	
interpretations	for	the	failure	of	replication.	Firstly,	in	our	study	we	used	easier	
ratios	 compared	 to	 Libertus	 and	 Brannon.	 Indeed,	 in	 their	 experiment	 infants	
observed	multiple	 ratios	 at	 6	months	 (1:4,	 1:3,	 1:2)	 and	 the	 preference	 scores	
were	 normalized	 for	 the	 maximum	 preference	 score	 in	 the	 linear	 regression.	




well	 established	 in	 12-month-old	 infants.	 In	 particular,	 in	 the	 1:4	 ratio	 the	
majority	of	the	infants	preferred	to	look	at	the	changing	and	we	didn't	find	a	high	
variability	across	subjects.	The	low	variability	in	the	preference	scores	could	be	




Another	 explanation	 could	be	 the	 amount	 of	 data	 that	we	 collected.	We	
obtained	 less	 looking	 times	 compared	 to	 previous	 study	 (Libertus	&	 Brannon:	
240	 seconds	 for	 one	 ratio;	 our	 study:	 80	 seconds	 for	 one	 ratio),	 earning	more	
information	about	infants’	preferences.		
Finally,	 a	more	 qualitative	 interpretation	might	 be	 the	 infant	 fatigue.	 In	
Libertus	 and	Brannon	 study	 infants	 observed	 the	 same	 ratio	 over	 time.	 In	 our	
study,	 we	 used	 a	 within	 subject	 design	 where	 infants	 observed	 first	 the	 easy	
ratio	 for	 two	 trials	and	 then	 the	difficult	 ratio	 in	 the	 last	 two.	 Infants	might	be	
more	tired	when	the	task	started	to	be	more	difficult	for	them.		
	 Future	 research	 should	 expand	 these	 results.	 To	 our	 knowledge,	 few	
studies	investigated	the	correlation	in	the	preference	scores	obtained	in	a	within	
subject	design	with	multiple	ratios.	Indeed,	all	recent	studies	proposed	multiple	
ratios	 in	 the	 same	 participants	 but	 they	 examined	 only	 whether	 there	 is	 a	
facilitation	 effect	 in	 presenting	 first	 the	 easy	 ratios	 and	 then	 the	most	 difficult	
one,	without	directly	 testing	 for	a	 correlation	across	 levels	of	difficulties	 (Odic,	
Hock,	 &	 Halberda,	 2014;	 Wang,	 Odic,	 Halberda,	 &	 Feigenson,	 2016;	 Wang,	
Libertus,	&	Feigenson,	2018).	There	 is	 therefore	a	gap	 in	the	assessment	of	 the	
change	detection	as	a	reliable	measure	with	multiple	ratios.		
In	the	face	processing	task,	the	first	interesting	finding	was	the	sensitivity	
of	 infants	 for	 second-order	 relations.	 Our	 results	 showed	 that	 infants	 looked	
significantly	 longer	 at	 the	 changing	 stream	 when	 the	 changes	 consisted	 in	
differences	 in	 spaces	 between	 facial	 features.	 This	 confirms	 evidence	 from	










2002;	 Schwarzer,	 Zauner,	 &	 Jovanovic,	 2007).	 Importantly,	 we	 demonstrated	
that	a	similar	effect	 is	present	using	children’s	 faces,	expanding	our	knowledge	
on	featural	vs.	second-order	processing	in	12-month-old	infants.	
However,	 these	 data	 show	 an	 opposite	 trend	 compared	 to	 the	 study	 of	
Quinn	and	Tanaka	(2009).	They	assessed	featural	and	second-order	sensitivity	at	
different	ages,	and	their	results	revealed	no	significant	differences	between	the	
mean	 preference	 and	 the	 chance	 level	 (50%	 of	 preference)	 in	 the	 featural	





old	 and	 6-to-7-month-old	 infants).	 Moreover,	 they	 separated	 the	 changes	 into	
different	 facial	regions	(upper	vs.	 lower)	and	this	separation	might	result	more	
difficult	for	infants	to	perceive,	in	particular	in	the	featural	level.	In	contrast	we	
did	 not	manipulate	 separately	 the	 two	 facial	 regions.	 All	 these	methodological	
differences	make	the	two	studies	not	really	comparable.		
Another	 important	 finding	 of	 our	 study	 with	 respect	 to	 the	 face	
processing	 was	 the	 significant	 positive	 correlation	 across	 the	 two	 levels	 of	







detection.	 Related	 to	 this,	 these	 findings	 lead	 to	 the	 suggestion	 that	 this	 task	
produces	 reliable	 measures	 and	 consequently	 can	 be	 used	 to	 assess	 not	 only	
numerical	cognition	but	also	face	processing	during	infancy.	These	results	added	
new	evidence	in	literature	about	the	stability	between	featural	and	second-order	
processes,	 since	 to	 our	 knowledge	 no	 previous	 studies	 have	 been	 conducted	
using	the	change	detection	paradigm.		
Comparing	face	processing	and	numerical	preference	tasks,	we	observed	
different	 correlational	 trends.	 We	 found	 more	 reliability	 for	 faces	 than	 for	
numbers.	An	 explanation	 is	 that	 in	 the	numerical	 change	detection	 there	were	
more	 variables	 that	 we	manipulated	 in	 the	 changing	 and	 in	 the	 non-changing	
streams,	such	as	 total	occupied	area	and	size	of	 the	dots.	These	visual	controls	
could	have	 created	more	noise	 in	 the	numerical	 infants’	preference	 scores.	We	
also	 performed	 separated	 correlations	 to	 test	 whether	 face	 processing	 and	
numerical	 acuity	 tapped	on	different	 cognitive	paths.	 Specifically,	we	 found	no	
significant	correlations	neither	in	the	easy	levels	(1:4	ratio	and	featural	change)	
nor	in	the	difficult	levels	(1:2	ratio	and	second-order	change),	providing	evidence	
for	 a	 dissociation	 between	 numerical	 acuity	 and	 face	 processing	 ability,	 and	
suggesting	 that	 they	 rely	 on	 separated	 pathways	 (e.g.	 Chinello,	 Cattani,	
Bonfiglioli,	 Dehaene,	 &	 Piazza,	 2013).	 These	 results	 are	 promising	 for	 the	









between	 the	 results	 at	 12	 months	 of	 age	 in	 discrimination	 of	 different	
numerosities	and	the	performances	at	3	years	old	 in	mathematical	 tasks.	 If	our	
hypotheses	 are	 confirmed,	 the	 ANS	 acuity	 could	 be	 assessed	 early	 in	 life	
facilitating	 the	precocity	 of	 diagnosis.	Moreover,	 these	 findings	would	 improve	
the	knowledge	of	 intervention	in	dyscalculia:	children	with	this	deficit	could	be	



























In	 the	numerical	cognition	 field,	 few	correlational	studies	have	explored	
this	 relation	 (Brown,	 Mcintosh	 &	 Taylor,	 2011;	 Crane,	 1996;	 Blevins-Knabe,	
Whiteside-Mansell	 &	 Selig,	 2007;	 Duncan	 et	 al.,	 2005).	 For	 example,	 evidence	
was	 found	 in	 a	 correlation	 between	 parental	 mathematical	 scores	 during	
childhood	and	math	scores	of	their	children	at	the	same	age	(Brown	et	al.,	2011).	





environmental	 factors,	 some	 focused	 their	 attention	 on	 parent	 “number	 talk”	
(e.g.	Levine,	Suriyakham,	Rowe,	Huttenlocher,	&	Gunderson,	2010;	Elliott	et	al.,	
2017)	 or	 on	 socioeconomic	 background	 (e.g.	 Saxe	 et	 al.,	 1987),	 revealing	 a	
predictive	role	in	the	achievement	of	early	mathematical	principles.	However,	all	







old	 and	 their	 parents	 completed	 an	 ANS	 acuity	 task,	 where	 they	 had	 to	
determine	which	one	of	two	arrays	contained	more	dots.	They	found	a	predictive	
role	 of	 parent	 mathematical	 abilities	 on	 children’s	 ability	 in	 multiple	 math	
measures	and,	more	interestingly,	ANS	parental	acuity	correlated	with	children’s	
ANS	 acuity.	 This	 is	 the	 unique	 study	 assessing	 specifically	 the	 correlation	 of	




In	 the	 field	 of	 face	 processing,	 researchers	 have	 focused	 their	 attention	
mainly	on	twin	studies	and	studies	of	prosopagnosia.	The	 idea	behind	the	twin	
studies	is	that	monozygotic	twins	totally	share	their	genes,	while	dizygotic	twins	
share	 only	 half,	 so	 if	 there	 is	 an	 important	 contribution	 of	 genes	 than	
monozygotic	 twins	 should	perform	more	 similarly	 than	dizygotic	ones.	 Indeed,	
findings	indicate	that	performances	in	monozygotic	twins	correlate	more	than	in	
dizygotic	 twins,	 providing	 evidence	 for	 face	 recognition	 as	 a	 highly	 heritable	
ability	 (e.g.	 Zhu	 et	 al.,	 2010).	 Some	 authors	 using	 a	 twin	 design	 proposed	 a	
specific	 gene	 for	 face	 perception	 (Wilmer	 et	 al.,	 2010;	 Zhu	 et	 al.,	 2010),	 in	
contrast	 to	 the	 idea	of	a	“generalist	genes	hypothesis”	(Kovas	&	Plomin,	2006),	
where	other	authors	supported	the	idea	of	a	gene	that	affects	several	areas	of	the	
brain	and,	by	extension,	different	cognitive	processes.	In	line	with	the	hypothesis	
of	 a	 specific	 gene,	 Shakeshaft	 and	 Plomin	 (2015)	 measured	 face	 recognition,	
object	recognition	and	general	cognitive	ability	obtaining	data	from	about	2000	
twins	 in	 the	 United	 Kingdom.	 They	 first	 replicated	 the	 higher	 correlation	 in	
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is	 or	 not	 a	 relation	 in	 the	 first	 steps	 of	 development.	 Thus,	 we	 correlated	 the	
infants’	preference	scores	of	the	previous	study	with	the	data	obtained	by	their	
parents.	They	were	assessed	with	a	dots	comparison	task	for	testing	ANS	acuity	
and	 with	 the	 Cambridge	 Face	 Memory	 Test	 (CFMT;	 Duchaine	 and	 Nakayama,	
2006)	for	testing	face	recognition	abilities.	Moreover,	we	separated	the	analyses	











age	 of	 fathers	 was	 38	 years	 (range	 =	 29	 years	 to	 48	 years).	 The	 parent	 who	
accompanied	his/her	child	at	 the	 lab	did	 the	task	there,	while	 the	other	parent	










In	 the	 dots	 comparison	 task	 (Fig.	 1),	 participants	 were	 presented	 with	
pairs	 of	 arrays	 of	 dots	 (black	 on	 white	 background),	 presented	 laterally	 to	 a	























CFMT	was	divided	 into	 3	 sections	 (with	 a	 practice	 part	 before	 these)	 and	was	













the	 test	 phase	 presented	 three	 items	 one	 of	 them	 was	 identical	 to	 the	 faces’	
	
	 48	
profile	 that	 participants	 had	memorized.	 In	 the	memory	 phase	 and	 in	 the	 test	
phase	 the	 image	 that	 participants	 had	 to	memorize	 and	 recognize	was	 exactly	
the	same.	The	procedure	was	repeated	for	5	times.		
In	 the	Novel	 images	(see	Fig.	 2C)	participants	were	presented	6	 faces	 in	
frontal	 profile	 in	 the	 same	 screen	 for	 20	 seconds.	 In	 this	 case,	 the	 test	 phase	
contained	 three	 images	 one	 of	 them	 was	 the	 right	 face	 but	 proposed	 in	 a	
different	lighting,	pose	or	both	compared	to	the	memory	phase	image.		
Finally,	 in	 the	Novel	 images	 with	 noise	participants	 memorized	 again	 6	





















w	 fraction.	 Accuracy	 was	 significantly	 higher	 for	 mothers	 than	 for	 fathers	
(Mmothers	=	77.96,	SD	=	9.23;	Mfathers	=	69.62,	SD	=	10.33;	 t(66)	=	3.51,	p	<	 .001).	
However,	the	comparison	between	the	w	fractions	only	approaches	significance:	
mothers	 had	 an	 internal	 w	 fraction	 of	 0.2	 (that	 reflects	 a	 better	 numerical	
estimation)	while	fathers	0.35	(p	=	.067).		
We	 performed	 separated	 correlations	 to	 test	 the	 hypothesis	 of	 a	 link	

































section	 performances	were	 good	with	 very	 few	mistakes,	 because	 participants	
were	presented	with	 the	 same	 image	 in	memory	and	 test	phase.	However,	 the	
performances	started	to	be	worst	 in	 the	second	and	third	section	(Novel	Image	
and	Novel	 Image	with	Noise).	 The	 slope	 became	 increasingly	 flat	 and	 deviated	
from	the	 ideal	 line.	Participants	made	more	errors	and	the	standard	deviations	
were	larger	in	these	sections.	Indeed,	as	mentioned	in	Apparatus	and	Procedure,	
in	 the	 test	 phase	 individuals	 found	 more	 complicated	 to	 recognize	 faces	 with	
different	 lighting,	 pose	 or	 both;	 this	 level	 of	 difficulty	 was	 emphasized	 by	 the	
addition	of	the	noise.	Indeed,	in	the	Novel	Image	with	noise,	faces	were	presented	
differently	 from	 the	memory	 test	 and	 reduced	 in	 quality	 by	 the	 noise,	making	






Fig.	4	Total	average	of	cumulative	scores	 for	each	 test	 item	 in	 the	CFMT.	Points	represents	 the	
means	 for	 each	 item;	 error	bars	 represent	 the	 standard	deviations.	 It	 is	 divided	 into	 the	 three	
sections	of	 the	 test	 by	 lines	 that	display	 the	 ideal	performance	 (with	 all	 correct	 answers).	The	
more	the	slope	deviates	from	these	lines,	the	more	errors	participants	have	done.		
	
Separated	 correlations	 were	 performed	 to	 test	 the	 hypothesis	 of	 a	 link	
between	parents’	and	infants’	performances	(see	Fig.	5).	We	separated	analyses	
for	 featural	 and	 second-order	 change.	 Regarding	 the	 first	 one,	 correlations	
revealed	a	positive	significant	correlation	between	fathers	and	infants	(r	=	.36,	p	
<	.05,	see	Fig.	5),	whereas	there	was	no	significant	correlation	between	mothers	
and	 infants	 (r	 =	 -.20,	 p	 =	 .229).	 In	 particular,	 the	 correlation	 affected	 more	
females	 than	 males.	 Indeed,	 there	 was	 a	 significant	 correlation	 between	
daughters	and	fathers	(r	=	.52,	p	<	.05)	and	no	correlation	with	sons	(r	=	.21,	p	=	









In	 the	 second-order	 change	 the	 correlations	 for	mothers	 and	 fathers	 were	 not	
significant	 (r	 mothers=	 .08,	 p	 =	 .632;	 r	 fathers	 =	 -.01,	 p	 =	 .941,	 Fig.	 6).	 In	 sum,	 we	

















particular,	 we	 aimed	 to	 explore	 whether	 there	 is	 a	 relation	 between	 parents-
infants	 in	 numerical	 acuity	 and	 face	processing.	 Parents	were	 administered	 an	
ANS	task	and	a	face	recognition	standardized	test	(CFMT).		
Considering	the	ANS	part,	we	found	no	significant	correlations	neither	in	
the	 1:4	 ratio	 nor	 in	 the	 1:2	 ratio.	 The	 present	 results	 suggest	 that	 numerical	
acuity	 in	 the	 first	 steps	 of	 development	 is	 not	 influenced	 by	 parental	 acuity.	
Considering	our	data	 there	does	not	 seem	to	emerge	a	genetic	 influence	 in	 the	
acquisition	 of	 this	 ability.	 Indeed,	 a	 recent	 genetic	 investigation	 (Tosto	 et	 al.,	
2014)	found	low	heritability	of	numerical	acuity	in	16-year-old	twins.	However,	
no	 studies	 have	 yet	 demonstrated	 a	 genetic	 role	 in	 the	 first	 years	 of	 life	 and	
further	studies	are	needed	to	clarify	this	aspect.		
On	 the	other	hand,	many	 studies	provided	 evidence	 for	 the	malleability	
and	the	 improvement	 through	specific	 trainings	of	ANS.	For	example,	Park	and	
Brannon	 (2013,	 2014)	 showed	 that	 non-symbolic	 approximate	 arithmetic	
trainings	 administered	 in	 multiple	 sessions	 enhanced	 symbolic	 arithmetic	
abilities.	 Moreover,	 many	 studies	 demonstrated	 the	 positive	 link	 between	
children’s	mathematical	abilities	and	math-related	practices	at	home	(Anders	et	
al.,	 2012;	 Lefevre	 et	 al.,	 2009;	 LeFevre,	 Polyzoi,	 Skwarchuk,	 Fast	 &	 Sowinski,	
2010b;	Kleemans,	Peeters,	Segers	&	Verhoeven,	2012).	It	is	therefore	plausible	to	





economic	 status	 and	numeracy	 experiences	 (with	 observational	 techniques)	 in	
ANS	acquisition	during	infancy.	Complementary	to	this,	research	could	focus	its	
attention	on	genetic	influences	in	the	first	years	of	life.		
However,	 another	 possible	 explanation	 for	 the	 absence	 of	 correlation	 is	
that	 the	 infants’	 measure	 of	 the	 numerical	 task	 is	 not	 a	 reliable	 one.	 Indeed,	
infants’	preferences	could	be	influenced	by	other	non-numerical	variables,	such	
as	 size	 and	 density	 that	 were	 controlled	 in	 the	 images.	 Future	 studies	 should	






indicated	 that	 participants	 made	 more	 errors	 in	 the	 Novel	 Image	 and	 Novel	
Image	with	Noise	sections	compared	to	the	Same	Image	section	as	evidenced	by	
the	 trend	 in	 the	 cumulative	 scores	 showed	 in	 Figure	 4.	 Indeed,	 parents	 found	
tougher	 the	 recognition	 of	 the	 same	 face	 when	 presented	 in	 a	 novel	 position,	
lighting	 or	 both.	 This	 difficulty	 still	 increases	with	 the	 addition	 of	 the	noise	 as	
presented	in	the	third	section	of	the	test	(see	also	McKone,	Martini,	&	Nakayama,	
2001).		
	 More	 interestingly,	 no	 studies	 have	 already	 investigated	 the	 correlation	
between	 parents	 and	 infants	 in	 the	 first	 year	 of	 life,	 separating	 mothers’	 and	





Moreover,	 this	 significant	 link	 appears	 stronger	 for	 females	 than	 for	
males.	These	findings	raise	the	question	whether	this	correlation	reflects	genetic	
or	 social	 components	 or	 an	 interaction	 of	 both.	 Noteworthy,	 studies	 on	
prosopagnosia	 (Duchaine,	 Germine,	 &	 Nakayama,	 2007;	 Grueter	 et	 al.,	 2006;	
Kennerknecht	 et	 al.,	 2006;	 Schmalzl	 et	 al.,	 2008)	 and	 twin	 studies	 (Zhu	 et	 al.,	
2010;	 Wilmer	 et	 al.,	 2010)	 highlight	 the	 influence	 of	 genetic	 aspects	 on	 face	
perception.	For	example,	studies	on	prosopagnosia	have	found	that	this	deficit	is	
linked	 to	 hereditary	 traits	 and	 is	 better	 explained	 by	 an	 autosomal	 dominant	
pattern.	 However,	 the	 specific	 influence	 of	 gender	 was	 not	 studied	 in	 depth.	
Moreover,	 to	 our	 knowledge,	 there	 are	 no	 studies	 that	 have	 investigated	 the	
genetic	role	in	normal	development	of	face	processing.		
	 Another	 line	 of	 research	 has	 tested	 the	 effects	 of	 experience	 on	 face	
perception.	We	know	that	in	the	first	years	of	life	face	recognition	becomes	more	
and	more	 precise	 for	 particular	 categories	 of	 stimuli.	 Indeed,	 infants	 begin	 to	
develop	 biases	 towards	 their	 own	 species	 and	 own	 races,	 showing	 advantages	
for	these	groups	in	face	recognition.	Macchi	Cassia,	Kuefner,	Picozzi	and	Vescovo	
(2009)	assessed	two	groups	of	children,	with	and	without	an	older	sibling,	and	
found	 that	 3-year-olds	 without	 siblings	 presented	 age	 bias	 for	 adults	 face	
whereas	 children	 with	 siblings	 did	 not	 display	 this	 bias.	 Therefore,	 the	
experience	during	 the	 first	 year	of	 life	plays	 a	 relevant	 role	 in	 shaping	 infants’	
knowledge	of	the	outside	world.		
Future	 research	 could	 enhance	 the	 potentiality	 of	 these	 preliminary	




fathers	 and	 infants	 is	 confirmed	or	not	 emerges.	Moreover,	prosopagnosia	 and	







































































with	 yellow	 stripes)	 appeared	 on	 the	 left	 side	 of	 an	 opaque	 screen,	 moved	
autonomously	 sideways	 and	 then	moved	 back	 behind	 the	 screen.	 Next,	 on	 the	
opposite	side,	an	 identical	object	was	 first	brought	 in	view	by	a	hand	and	 then	
pushed	 back	 behind	 the	 screen	 (Experiments	 1	 and	 2).	 The	 screen	was	 finally	
removed	revealing	either	one	or	two	objects.	Infants	looked	longer	at	one-object	
test	events,	suggesting	 that	 they	expected	to	 find	two	objects.	Adults	were	also	
shown	these	animations,	and	they	were	asked	for	their	numerical	expectations.	
Contrary	 to	 infants,	 they	 expected	 one	 single	 object	 (Experiment	 3).	 While	
infants’	 numerical	 expectations	 appeared	 to	 be	 dominated	 by	 information	 on	
object	 self	 or	 induced	 motion,	 adults’	 expectations	 were	 mainly	 guided	 by	
information	on	object	static	features	such	as	shape,	size	and	color.	These	findings	













	 The	 ability	 to	 establish	 how	 many	 objects	 are	 present	 in	 a	 scene	 is	 a	
crucial	aspect	of	humans’	cognitive	system.	This	ability	 is	present	very	early	 in	
humans,	indicating	its	pre-verbal	nature.	It	was	proposed	that	two	distinct	pre-
verbal	 systems	 underlie	 infants’	 numerical	 skills:	 the	 Approximate	 Number	
System	 and	 the	Object	 Tracking	 System	 (Feigenson	 et	 al.,	 2004;	 Piazza,	 2010).	
The	 first	 system	 allows	 individuals	 to	 estimate	 numerosities	without	 counting	
and	it	is	imprecise	but	has	no	limit	as	for	the	set	size	to	which	it	applies,	whereas	
the	second	one	allows	exact	and	precise	quantification.	Carey	(2009)	postulated	
a	 specific	 system	 of	 parallel	 individuation	 processes	 that	 is	 present	 in	 young	
infants.	 According	 to	 this	 theory,	 infants	 can	 generate	 WM	 models	 where	
individuals	 (e.g.,	 objects)	 are	 represented	 by	 non-numerical	 mental	 symbols.	
Each	symbol	corresponds	one	object	in	the	world	on	the	basis	of	the	one-to-one	
correspondence	 principle.	 Therefore,	 infants	 can	 implicitly	 represent	 the	





2	 and	3	 objects	 (Feigenson	&	Carey,	 2003;	 see	 also	 Feigenson	&	Carey,	 2005).	






Small	 set	 quantification	 relies	 on	 object	 individuation	 processes	 (e.g.,	
Baillargeon	et	al.,	2012),	the	ability	to	track	and	locate	a	small	number	of	objects	
through	 space	 and	 time	 (e.g.,	 Baillargeon	 et	 al.,	 2012;	 Brower	&	Wilcox,	 2013;	
Kibbe	&	Leslie,	2013;	Woods	&	Wilcox,	2013;	Xu	&	Carey,	1996).	One	key	goal	in	
individuation	 research	 is	 to	 determine	 which	 kind	 of	 information	 infants	
spontaneously	 use	 to	 individuate	 objects.	 In	 a	 seminal	 study,	 Xu	 and	 Carey	
(1996)	 started	 the	 systematic	 investigation	 of	 which	 factors	 determine	 the	
success	 of	 infants’	 individuation	 process,	 i.e.	 perceive	 objects	 as	 individual	
entities,	 traceable	 in	 space/time	 and	 countable.	 They	 showed	 two	 objects,	




behind	 it.	 The	 screen	 was	 then	 removed,	 showing	 either	 only	 one	 of	 the	 two	
original	objects	(e.g.,	the	red	truck)	or	both.	In	the	‘spatiotemporal’	condition,	the	
same	 objects	 were	 presented	 together	 on	 the	 stage	 (thus	 each	 occupied	 a	
different	 spatial	 position)	 before	 disappearing	 behind	 the	 screen.	 In	 the	 test	
events,	the	screen	was	removed,	revealing	either	one	or	two	objects.	Ten-month-
olds	 failed	 to	 detect	 the	 numerical	 violation	 in	 the	 property/kind	 condition,	
showing	 that	 their	 individuation	 system	 had	 not	 generated	 two	 distinct	
representations	 for	 the	 two	 objects.	 On	 the	 contrary,	 they	 succeeded	 in	 the	
spatiotemporal	 condition,	 detecting	 the	 numerical	 violation	 when	 they	 were	
shown	 one-object	 test	 events.	 These	 findings	 led	 the	 authors	 to	 suggest	 that,	
before	12	months,	 infants	 can	 individuate	multiple	objects	 (at	 least	up	 to	 two)	
when	 these	objects	 are	 simultaneously	 shown,	 thus	occupying	different	 spatial	
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locations;	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 when	 objects	 are	 shown	 sequentially	 and	 the	
available	spatiotemporal	information	on	their	identity	is	ambiguous,	infants	fail	
to	individuate	two	distinct	objects.	This	suggests	that	they	could	employ	the	very	
general	 sortal	 concept	 OBJECT,	 that	 is	 a	 representation	 coding	 spatiotemporal	
properties	(the	object	location	at	a	certain	time),	but	they	could	not	rely	on	other	
information	such	as	shape,	which	are	more	specific	than	OBJECT.	The	‘object	first	




Pylyshyn's	 model	 of	 individuation	 (Pylyshyn,	 1989).	 According	 to	 Pylyshyn,	
individuation	consists	in	applying	attentional	tags	(so	called	indexes)	to	objects.	
During	the	first	months	of	life	these	indexes	are	assigned	on	the	sole	basis	of	the	
location	occupied	by	 the	objects,	and	only	 later	can	 they	be	assigned	by	 taking	
into	 account	 other	 perceptual	 features	 such	 as	 shape	 or	 color.	 This	 idea	 is	
somehow	 connected	 with	 the	 distinction	 between	 the	 ‘what’	 and	 ‘where’	
pathways	 in	 the	 brain	 (Ungerleider	 &	 Haxby,	 1994).	 Within	 this	 framework,	
Leslie	 proposed	 that	 before	 the	 first	 year	 of	 life,	 objects’	 indexing	 is	 mostly	
guided	by	the	‘where’	system,	while	between	10	and	12	months	it	is	also	guided	
by	information	coming	from	the	‘what’	system.	This	explains	why	young	infants	
might	 be	 unable	 to	 individuate	 two	 objects	 based	 only	 on	 feature	 differences	
such	 as	 shape	 or	 color,	 but	 they	 are	 able	 to	 in	 presence	 of	 relevant	
spatiotemporal	information.	
However,	none	of	these	models	predict	the	results	obtained	in	some	other	





even	 when	 they	 were	 not	 shown	 to	 occupy	 different	 spatial	 locations.	 These	
findings	 led	to	 the	proposal	of	 the	 ‘human	first	hypothesis’,	according	to	which	
before	 12	 months,	 infants	 can	 individuate	 objects	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 the	 sortal	






longer	 at	 the	 one-object	 outcome,	 showing	 that	 they	 had	 individuated	 two	
objects.	These	findings	support	the	idea	that	infants	younger	than	12	months	can	
individuate	 two	 different	 objects	 when	 dynamic	 information	 indicating	 the	
presence	of	one	agent	and	one	 inert	object	 is	 available.	A	preparedness	 to	pay	
attention	to	such	 information	was	also	 found	 in	younger	 infants	 in	studies	 that	
did	not	 investigate	object	 individuation.	At	 seven	months,	 infants	quickly	 learn	
information	about	 the	self-propelled	motion	of	novel	wind-up	 toy	animals,	and	
retain	 it	 over	 a	 15-min	 delay	 (Markson	 &	 Spelke,	 2006)	 and	 even	 neonates	
display	 some	 sensitivity	 to	 information	 about	 self-motion	 (Di	 Giorgio,	 Longhi,	
Simion,	 &	 Vallortigara,	 2017;	 see	 also	 Scholl	 &	 Tremoulet,	 2000	 for	 related	
findings).		
One	 alternative	 account	 focuses	 on	 event	 complexity	 and	 information	
consistency	(Baillargeon	et	al.,	2012;	Wilcox,	1999;	Wilcox	&	Baillageon,	1998a,	
b).	 At	 its	 core	 there	 is	 the	 claim	 that	 young	 infants	 are	 able	 to	 encode	 both	
	
	 66	
spatiotemporal	and	 featural	 information	 (e.g.,	 shape	and	color)	 in	 some	simple	
individuation	tasks,	involving	'event	monitoring',	but	not	in	other	more	complex	
tasks,	 involving	 'event	 mapping'.	 These	 authors	 posit	 that	 individuation	
processes	involve	the	representation	of	two	types	of	information,	structural	and	
variable	 information.	 Structural	 information	 consists	 of	 spatiotemporal	 as	well	
as	 categorical	 information	 concerning	 very	 general	 concepts,	 such	 as	 self-
propelled	 and	 inert	 object,	 whereas	 variable	 information	 includes	 object	
perceptual	 features	 such	 as	 size,	 shape,	 color	 and	 pattern;	 these	 cues	 are	
typically	diagnostic	of	more	specific	concepts,	such	as	bird,	dog,	car	and	ball.	The	
model	also	posits	that	infants	at	ten	months	are	able	to	represent	both	types	of	
information,	 as	 a	 host	 of	 research	 on	 infants'	 physical	 reasoning	 has	 shown.	
Moreover,	according	to	this	model,	ten-month-olds'	failure	to	generate	numerical	
expectations	 in	Xu	and	Carey	(1996)	property/kind	condition	was	not	due	to	a	
failure	 to	 represent	 featural	 information,	 but	 to	 the	 joint	 effect	 of	 two	 other	
factors:	 the	 inconsistency	between	 the	 two	 information	 layers	 and	 the	need	 to	
carry	over	object	representations	from	one	event	(the	object	occlusion	event)	to	
the	 next	 (the	 screen	 removal	 event).	 They	 point	 out	 that	 the	 structural	
information	 leads	 to	 expect	 a	 single	 object	while	 variable	 information	 leads	 to	
expect	two.	Due	to	this	inconsistency,	the	carry	over	process	that	is	required	to	
transfer	 object	 representations	 from	 one	 event	 to	 the	 next	 breaks	 down,	
preventing	infants	from	generating	any	specific	numerical	expectation.	
The	 model	 proposed	 by	 Baillargeon	 et	 al.	 (2012)	 raises	 an	 interesting	
question.	How	would	 infants	 and	 adults	 respond	 to	 a	 complex,	 event-mapping	
scenario	 in	 which	 self-motion	 (structural	 information)	 and	 static	 (variable	




is	 one	 displays	 self-propelled	motion	 and	 another	 passive	motion	 (e.g.,	 Csibra,	
2008;	 Gergely,	 Nádasdy,	 Csibra,	 &	 Bíró,	 1995;	 Luo	 et	 al.,	 2009;	 Johnson	 et	 al.,	
2008;	 Luo	&	Baillargeon,	 2005a;	Markson	&	 Spelke,	 2006;	 Scholl	&	Gao,	 2013;	
Surian,	Caldi,	&	Sperber,	2007).	Given	the	 inconsistency	between	the	structural	
and	 variable	 information,	 Baillargeon	 et	 al.	 (2012)	 model	 makes	 a	 clear	
prediction:	 young	 infants	 should	 not	 be	 able	 to	 generate	 any	 numerical	
expectations.	 By	 contrast,	 if	 infants	 before	 12	 months	 rely	 on	 the	 self-
motion/passive	motion	 contrast,	 but	have	difficulties	 in	binding	 static	 features	
such	as	shape,	color	and	size	 to	 their	object	 files,	 they	should	generate	specific	
numerical	 expectations,	 but	 their	 expectations	 may	 be	 different	 from	 those	
generated	by	adults.	Since	the	objects	that	alternatively	appear	at	the	two	sides	
of	a	screen	are	identical,	but	display	different	kinds	of	motion	(self-propelled	vs.	
passive	 movement,	 possibly	 activating	 the	 sortals	 AGENT	 and	 INERT	 OBJECT,	
respectively),	 infants	 should	 individuate	 two	 objects.	 By	 contrast,	 adults	 will	
have	no	difficulties	in	binding	variable	(static)	feature	information	to	their	object	
files	 and	 this	will	 lead	 them	 to	 see	 the	 scenarios	 as	 involving	 the	 same	 object	




	 Participants.	 Forty	 full-term	 infants	 participated	 in	 the	 experiment,	 19	





excluded	 due	 to	 parental	 interference	 (n	 =	 1),	 fussiness	 (n	 =	 4)	 or	 technical	
failure	(n	=	2).		





iMac	 27	 inch	 monitor	 (resolution	 2560	 x	 1440,	 display	 size	 34	 cm	 x	 59	 cm)	
positioned	 in	 the	 middle,	 on	 which	 the	 events	 were	 shown.	 A	 curtain	 was	
lowered	 on	 the	 monitor	 between	 trials	 and	 at	 both	 sides	 of	 the	 monitor	 two	
panels	hided	the	rest	of	the	apparatus.	There	was	a	webcam	under	the	monitor	
to	focus	on	the	infant’s	face,	in	order	to	observe	the	infant’s	behavior	and	record	
looking	 time	 fixations.	 The	 experiment	 was	 conducted	 in	 a	 quiet	 and	 well	 lit	
testing	room.		
	 Stimuli	and	Events		











objects	 (i.e.,	 a	 yellow	duck	 and	 a	 red	 car;	 see	 Figure	 1).	 Each	 trial	 started	 and	
ended	with	the	raising	and	lowering	of	a	curtain.		
Each	infant	observed	four	introductory	trials	and	there	were	two	orders	
of	 outcome	 presented	 after	 the	 removal	 of	 the	 screen	 (1,	 2,	 2,	 1	 or	 2,	 1,	 1,	 2),	
counterbalanced	 across	 participants.	 Each	 trial	 ended	 when	 the	 infant	 looked	





Figure	1.	Schematic	 representation	of	 the	 Introductory	trials.	 Infants	were	 shown	a	 screen	 and	
then	a	hand	removed	it	showing	either	a	single	object	or	two	objects.		
	 	
Test	 trials:	Agency	condition.	 The	 agency	 condition	 consisted	 of	 four	 trials.	 The	
first	pair	of	trials	involved	a	simple	object	(i.e.,	a	red	ball,	4.00	cm	x	4.00	cm)	and	
the	second	pair	a	different	object	(i.e.,	a	blue	box	with	yellow	stripes,	5.00	cm	x	






seconds	 an	 object	 (e.g.,	 the	 red	 ball)	 emerged	 from	behind	 the	 screen	with	 an	
autonomous	 movement,	 it	 moved	 back	 and	 forth	 for	 three	 times,	 and	 then	
returned	behind	the	screen,	disappearing	 from	the	view	(duration:	10	seconds,	
Fig.	 2).	 In	 the	 same	 familiarization	 phase,	 from	 the	 opposite	 side	 a	 hand	
appeared	on	the	scene,	went	behind	the	screen	and	grabbed	an	object	(with	the	
same	features	of	the	object	with	the	autonomous	movement).	The	hand	dropped	









2)	 were	 counterbalanced	 across	 participants.	 Each	 test	 trial	 ended	 when	 the	
infant	looked	away	for	2	consecutive	seconds,	after	having	looked	for	a	minimum	

















the	 first	 object	 shown	 on	 the	 scene.	 Then	 the	 hand	 put	 the	 object	 behind	 the	 screen.	 The	 test	









	 Procedure.	 Infants	 sat	 on	 their	 parent’s	 lap	 at	 a	 distance	 of	




Two	 experienced	 observers	 recorded	 the	 looking	 times	 and	 they	 were	
blind	 about	 the	 order	 of	 the	 test	 events	 that	 were	 presented.	 Each	 of	 them	
pressed	a	button	when	 the	 infant	was	 looking	at	 the	events.	The	 looking	 times	
recorded	by	the	primary	observer	were	used	to	determine	the	end	of	each	trial	
and	in	the	data	analyses.		
The	 computer	 calculated	 the	 inter-observer	 agreement	 for	 each	 infant,	
first	 dividing	 each	 trial	 into	 100	ms	 intervals,	 and	 then	 assessing	within	 each	
interval	whether	 the	 two	 observers	 agreed	 or	 not.	 Agreement	 percentage	was	




	 Introductory	trials.	Looking	 times	were	analyzed	 in	a	2	×	2	ANOVA	with	
the	 outcome	 (one-object/two-objects)	 as	 within-subjects	 factor	 and	 the	
condition	(agency/baseline)	as	between-subjects	 factor;	 there	was	a	significant	
main	 effect	 of	 outcome	 (F(1,	 38)	 =	 5.68,	 p	 =	 .022,	 η2	 =	 .13)	 and	 a	 significant	
interaction	 condition	×	 outcome	 (F(1,	 38)	 =	 5.35,	p	 =	 .026,	 	η2	 =	 .12).	 Planned	









for	 each	 pair	 trial,	 as	 for	 the	 introductory	 events.	 Shapiro-Wilk	 tests	 revealed	
that	half	of	the	data	that	we	use	for	the	analyses	were	not	normally	distributed.	
We	 therefore	 performed	 both	 parametric	 and	 non-parametric	 analyses.	 Data	
were	analysed	in	a	2	×	2	ANOVA	with	the	outcome	(one-object/two-objects)	as	
within-subjects	 factor	and	the	condition	(agency/baseline)	as	between-subjects	




In	 the	 agency	 condition,	 infants	 looked	 significantly	 longer	 at	 the	 one-
object	 outcome	 than	 at	 the	 two-objects	 outcome	 (Mone-obj.	=	 16.97	 s,	 SD	 =	 8.63,	
Mtwo-obj.	=	12.62	s,	SD	=	4.91;	 t(19)	=	2.36,	p	=	 .029,	 two-tails,	 see	Fig.	3).	 In	 the	
baseline	condition,	 looking	 times	did	not	differ	 for	 the	 two	outcomes	(Mone-obj.	=	
11.1	s,	SD	=	3.58;	Mtwo-obj.	=	12.14	s,	SD	=	5.68;	t(19)	=	-.90,	p	=	.377).	We	found	a	
significant	difference	between	the	one-object	outcome	in	 the	agency	and	 in	 the	
baseline	condition	(p	<	.01)	but	not	for	the	two-objects	outcome	(p	=	.78).	
Wilcoxon	signed-rank	test	yielded	results	similar	to	parametric	tests.	We	
found	higher	 looking	 times	 for	 the	one-object	outcome	 in	 the	agency	condition	
compared	 to	 the	 baseline	 condition	 (W	=	 272.5,	 p	 =	 .051);	 the	 same	 trend	 is	
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present	 also	 comparing	 one-object	 outcome	 and	 two-objects	 outcome	 in	 the	
agency	condition	(V	=	158,	p	=	.048).	
	
Figure	 3.	 Mean	 looking	 times	 (and	 standard	 errors)	 at	 one-	 and	 two-objects	 outcomes	 in	 the	
agency	 and	 baseline	 conditions	 for	 Experiment	 1	 and	 Experiment	 2.	 The	 asterisk	 (*)	
indicates	p	<	0.05	and	two	asterisks	(**)	indicate	p	<	0.01.	
	
In	 sum,	 the	 results	 of	 this	 experiment	 clearly	 show	 that	 10-month-old	
infants	 rely	 on	 different	 motion	 cues	 to	 individuate	 objects.	 Comparing	 these	
results	with	those	obtained	by	Xu	and	Carey	(1996),	we	can	conclude	that	at	10	
months,	 self-propelled	 and	 induced	 motion	 contrast	 is	 not	 only	 sufficient	 for	
individuation,	 but	 it	 is	 a	 more	 powerful	 cue	 compared	 to	 shape	 and	 color	
features.		
However,	these	results	could	also	be	interpreted	in	a	different	way.	Maybe	





on	 the	 floor.	 Infants	may	 have	 used	 these	 additional	 cues	 derived	 from	 object	
trajectories	in	order	to	individuate	different	objects.	Therefore	they	might	have	
looked	 longer	 at	 the	 one-object	 outcome	 not	 because	 of	 the	 contrast	 in	 the	
motion	 information,	 but	 simply	 because	 of	 their	 different	 trajectories.	 This	
suggestion	 seems	 to	 be	 supported	 by	 some	 findings	 demonstrating	 that	 7-
month-old	 infants	 succeed	 in	 individuating	 two	 objects	 when	 they	 are	 shown	
their	 different	 functional	 role,	 such	 as	 hammering	 and	 pouring	 (Wilcox	 and	
Chapa,	 2004).	 Note	 that	 during	 the	 demonstrations,	 the	 objects	 not	 only	
displayed	different	funtions,	but	they	also	followed	distinct	paths.			
A	 second	 issue	 is	 the	 presence	 of	 the	 hand	 appearing	 on	 one	 side	 of	 the	
screen	and	not	on	the	other.	The	presence	of	the	hand	in	one	side	of	the	screen	
could	 have	 influenced	 infants	 by	 creating	 the	 expectation	 of	 two	 different	
objects,	one	with	the	hand	and	the	other	without	it.		
The	 aim	 of	 Experiment	 2	 was	 to	 eliminate	 the	 differences	 in	 movement	
trajectory	and	the	presence/absence	of	the	hand	in	order	to	check	whether	these	
differences	 were	 responsible	 for	 the	 reported	 results	 of	 Experiment	 1.	 In	
Experiment	 2,	 the	 trajectories	 of	 the	 motions	 displayed	 by	 the	 self-propelled	
object	and	by	the	passive	object	were	the	same.	In	addition,	we	added	a	hand	on	
the	 side	 of	 the	 screen	where	 the	 self-propelled	 object	 appeared,	 but	 the	 hand	
never	touched	the	object.	If	infants	rely	only	on	motion	information	and	neglect	
non-motion	information,	we	should	observe	similar	results	as	in	Experiment	1.	If	












Introductory	 trials.	 The	 Introductory	 trials	 were	 the	 same	 as	 proposed	 in	
Experiment	 1.	 Infants	 observed	 a	 screen	 on	 the	 scene	 for	 3	 seconds.	 After	 the	






across	 participants.	 Each	 trial	 ended	 when	 the	 infant	 looked	 away	 for	 2	









In	 the	 familiarization	phase	a	screen	was	presented	 in	 the	middle	of	 the	












and	 disappeared	 from	 the	 scene	 (duration:	 14	 seconds).	 The	 cycle	 of	 object	
appearances	and	disappearances	was	repeated	four	times	for	the	first	and	third	
trial	 and	 twice	 for	 the	 second	and	 fourth	 trials.	Differently	 from	Experiment	1,	
the	objects	that	are	seen	on	the	two	sides	of	the	screen	present	mirrored	motion	
paths	 (in	 one	 case	 self-propelled,	 in	 the	 other	 case	 passive).	 The	 hand	 that	
pushed	 the	object	 reproduces	motions	 that	were	symmetrical	 compared	 to	 the	
motions	reproduced	by	the	self-propelled	object	(see	Figure	2).		











from	the	monitor.	Parents	were	 instructed	 to	 remain	silent	and	not	 to	point	at	
the	monitor	during	the	test	phase.	Participants	observed	four	introductory	trials	
and	 four	 test	 trials,	 in	 either	 the	 agency	 or	 the	 baseline	 condition	 as	 in	
Experiment	1.			
	 Two	observers	recorded	the	infants’	 looking	times	and	were	blind	about	
the	 order	 of	 the	 animations	 presented	 on	 the	 screen.	 The	 average	 of	 inter-
observer	agreement	was	93%	(range	=	87%	-	95%).		
Analyses	













Test	 trials.	Shapiro-Wilk	 test	 revealed	 that	 the	majority	 of	 the	 data	was	
not	 normally	 distributed	 (agency	 condition:	Wone-obj.	=	 .943,	 p	=	 .56,	Wtwo-obj.	=	
.719,	p	<	.01;	baseline	condition:	Wone-obj.	=	.76,	p	<	.01,	Wtwo-obj.	=	.817,	p	<	.05).	We	
therefore	 performed	 as	 principal	 analyses	 non-parametric	 comparisons.	 In	 the	
agency	 condition,	 infants	 looked	 significantly	 longer	at	 the	one-object	outcome	
than	at	the	two-objects	outcome	(Mone-obj	=	14.09	s,	SD	=	4.06,	Mtwo-obj.	=	9.83	s,	SD	
=	 4.76;	V	 =	 46.5,	 p	 <	 .05;	 parametric	 analyses	 approached	 significance:	 t(9)	 =	












types	 of	 outcomes.	 Thus,	 we	 provide	 further	 evidence	 for	 the	 individuation	
process	primarily	based	on	dynamic	 information	and	rule	out	 the	role	of	other	
factors	such	as	motion	trajectory	and	presence	of	the	hand.		
While	 the	 results	 of	 the	 first	 two	 experiments	 suggest	 that	 self-motion	
features	 dominate	 the	 infants’	 object	 individuation	 processes,	 it	 is	 not	 clear	




to	 see	 the	 scene	as	 involving	 the	 same	object	 that	behaves	quite	differently	on	
the	 two	 sides	 of	 the	 screen.	 In	 order	 to	 check	 whether	 the	 same	 primacy	 of	
motion	 cues	 over	 other	 visual	 features	 such	 as	 shape,	 size	 and	 color	 is	 also	
present	in	adults,	we	presented	the	same	stimuli	used	in	Experiment	1	to	a	group	
of	 adults	 and,	 since	 spontaneous	 looking	 times	would	 not	 work	 as	 dependent	




	 Participants.	 Eighty-three	 university	 students	 participated	 (M	 =	 20.44	
years,	SD	=	1.34).	Participants	volunteered	their	help	and	were	not	given	credit	
for	 their	 participation.	 They	 were	 tested	 in	 groups	 and	 two	 experimenters	
observed	them	to	ensure	the	independence	of	the	answers.		
	 Materials	 and	 procedure.	 Adults	 were	 presented	 the	 familiarization	
phase	of	the	animation	stimuli	used	in	the	agency	condition	of	Experiment	1.	At	
the	end	of	that	phase	they	were	given	a	written	question	tapping	their	numerical	
expectation.	 Half	 of	 the	 participants	 observed	 the	 event	 involving	 the	 red	 ball	
and	 the	 other	 half	 the	 event	 involving	 the	 blue	 box	 with	 yellow	 stripes.	
Participants	 observed	 only	 one	 video.	 Animations	 were	 presented	 on	 a	 large	









and	 the	 rest	 (19.5%)	 two	 objects,	 p	 <	 .001,	 binomial	 test,	 two	 tails.	 A	 similar	
strong	 bias	 was	 found	 in	 the	 responses	 to	 the	 open	 test	 question:	 88.1%	
responded	that	 they	expected	one	object,	p	<	 .001,	binomial	 test,	 two	tails.	The	
rest	 responded	 that	 they	expected	either	 two	objects	 (7.14%),	or	 “at	least	one”	
(4.77%).		
General	Discussion	
In	 this	 study,	 10-month-olds	 were	 shown	 objects	 that	 emerged	 and	
disappeared	 one	 at	 a	 time	 behind	 a	 screen.	 In	 the	 agency	 condition	 of	
Experiment	 1,	 infants	 were	 shown	 one	 object	 appearing	 and	 moving	
autonomously	on	one	side	of	the	screen;	then,	on	the	opposite	side	of	the	screen,	
an	 identical	 object	 was	 grasped	 by	 a	 hand,	 dropped	 on	 the	 floor	 and	 pushed	
again	behind	 the	screen.	 In	 the	 test	phase	 the	occluder	was	removed	revealing	
either	 one	 or	 two	 objects.	 Infants	 looked	 significantly	 longer	 at	 the	 one-object	
outcome,	 showing	 that	 that	 they	 had	 individuated	 two	 objects.	 However,	 in	
Experiment	1	infants	may	have	paid	attention	to	some	irrelevant	aspects,	such	as	
the	fact	that	the	two	objects	followed	different	motion	paths	(the	self-propelled	
object	moved	 horizontally	 right-to-left	 and	 back,	 the	 inert	 object	 was	 grasped	
and	dropped	on	 the	 floor)	or	 the	 fact	 that	 a	hand	appeared	on	one	 side	of	 the	
screen	 (‘inert	 object	 side’),	 but	 there	 was	 no	 hand	 on	 the	 other	 side	 (‘self-
propelled	 object	 side’).	 In	 Experiment	 2	 we	 eliminated	 these	 differences	 and	
replicated	 the	 results	 found	 in	 Experiment	 1.	 Finally,	 in	 Experiment	 3,	 adults	
observed	 the	 same	 event	 stimuli	 used	 in	 Experiment	 1	 and	were	 asked	 about	






These	 findings	 demonstrate	 that	 infants	 at	 10	 months	 can	 individuate	
multiple	 objects	when	 they	 are	 not	 presented	 simultaneously	 (thus	 occupying	
two	specific	positions	 in	space)	and,	crucially,	even	when	they	are	perceptually	
identical,	 as	 long	 as	 they	 differ	 in	 the	 kind	 of	 movement	 (self-propelled	 vs.	
passive)	that	they	exhibit.	This	is	consistent	with	the	claim	that	infants,	as	early	
as	 10	 months	 of	 age,	 spontaneously	 individuate	 objects	 by	 relying	 on	 sortal	
concepts	more	 specific	 than	OBJECT,	 such	as	AGENT,	 INERT	OBJECT	 (Surian	&	
Caldi,	 2010)	 and	 HUMAN	 (Bonatti	 et	 al.,	 2002;	 Bonatti	 et	 al.,	 2005).	 It	 also	
highlights	the	important	role	of	motion	features	in	infants’	individuation	process.	
The	 findings	of	 the	study	are	also	consistent	with	Leslie	and	colleagues'	
(1998)	 neuropsychological	 model	 of	 the	 object	 tracking	 system.	 According	 to	
that	model,	infants	first	create	a	temporary	object	representation,	an	‘object	file’,	
mainly	 relying	 on	 spatiotemporal	 information	 processed	 by	 the	 ‘where	 neural	
route’	 and	 only	 later	 they	 encode	 in	 the	 object	 file	 also	 featural	 information	
processed	 by	 the	 ‘what	 neural	 route’.	 The	 two	 pathways	would	 be	 completely	
connected	 only	 at	 the	 end	 of	 the	 first	 year	 of	 life.	 However,	 our	 results	
demonstrated	 that	 infants	 before	 12	months	 can	 assign	 two	 different	 indexes	
when	self-motion	 information	 is	available.	Previous	neuroimaging	studies	have	
found	that	while	features	such	as	shape	activates	the	‘what	system’	and	motion	
the	 ‘where	 system’,	 a	 specific	 type	 of	 object	 motion,	 i.e.	 biological	 motion	
activates	both	what	 and	where	 systems	 (e.g.,	 Vaina	 et	 al.,	 2001).	This	 suggests	




them	 to	 assign	 a	new	object	 index	on	 the	basis	 of	 spatiotemporal	 information,	






and	 variable	 information.	 Structural	 information	 include	 both	 spatiotemporal	
and	 information	 that	 is	 diagnostic	 of	 very	 general	 concepts	 (e.g.,	 the	
animate/inanimate	distinction),	such	as	self-propelled	motion,	whereas	variable	
information	 include	object	 features	 that	are	more	 likely	 to	 change	contextually	
or	 that	 are	 typically	 diagnostic	 of	 more	 specific	 concepts,	 such	 as	 size,	 shape,	
color	 and	 texture.	 According	 to	 this	 model,	 young	 infants	 fail	 to	 generate	
numerical	 expectations	 in	 complex	 tasks,	 such	 as	 Xu	 and	 Carey	 (1996)	
property/kind	 condition	 because	 of	 (a)	 the	 inconsistency	 between	 the	 two	
information	 layers	and	(b)	event	mapping	requirements	 (i.e.,	 the	need	 to	carry	
over	object	representations	from	the	event	of	object	occlusion	to	the	next	event	
involving	 the	 screen	 removal).	 Structural	 information	 leads	 to	 expect	 a	 single	
object	 while	 variable	 information	 leads	 to	 expect	 two	 and	 this	 inconsistency	
prevents	 infants	 from	generating	any	numerical	expectation	because	 it	 leads	to	
the	breakdown	of	the	information	transfer	that	is	required	in	the	event	mapping	
tasks.	
This	 account	 also	 predicts	 that	 infants	 will	 not	 generate	 numerical	
expectations	 in	 the	 agency	 conditions	 in	 Experiments	 1	 and	 2	 of	 the	 present	
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study.	 In	 these	 conditions	 there	 was	 inconsistency	 between	 structural	 and	
variable	 information	 (i.e.,	 structural	 information	 support	 two-object	
expectations	whereas	variable	information	support	one-object	expectations)	and	
there	 were	 also	 event-mapping	 requirements	 (i.e.,	 the	 need	 to	 carry	 over	 the	
relevant	 object	 representations	 from	 the	 occlusion	 event	 to	 the	 next,	 screen	
removal	event).	The	crucial	difference	between	the	present	study	and	previous	
works	 was	 the	 reversal	 of	 the	 numerical	 expectations	 supported	 by	 the	 two	
types	of	information.	In	the	present	study,	structural	information	leads	to	expect	
two	objects,	while	variable	information	supports	the	numerical	expectation	of	a	
single	 object.	 In	 previous	 studies	 it	 was	 the	 opposite.	 Thus,	 a	 model	 that		
emphasizes	 the	 effect	 of	 the	 inconsistency	 between	 structural	 and	 variable	
information	 predicts,	 both	 for	 Xu	 and	Carey's	 property/kind	 condition	 and	 for	
our	agency	conditions,	that	infants	will	not	generate	any	numerical	expectation.	
By	 contrast,	 our	 results	 clearly	 point	 out	 that	 both	 adults	 and	 young	 infants	
generated	 a	 specific	 expectation.	 Crucially,	 infants'	 expectation	 was	 consistent	
with	 self-motion	 (‘structural’)	 information	 whereas	 adults'	 expectation	 relied	
more	on	shape	and	color	(‘variable’)	information.	The	present	findings	therefore	
suggest	 that	 either	 the	 structural	 vs.	 variable	 information	 consistency	 plays	 a	
less	important	role	that	it	is	assumed	in	Baillargeon	et	al.	(2012)	model,	or	that	
such	model	 needs	 to	 revise	 such	 distinction,	 perhaps	 by	 introducing	 a	 further	
differentiation	 between	 spatiotemporal	 and	 self-motion	 information,	 which,	 at	
present	are	lumped	together	into	the	structural	information	category.	
In	 conclusion,	 our	 findings	 indicate	 that,	 lacking	 spatiotemporal	
information,	two	objects	that	only	differ	in	motion	cues,	a	crucial	feature	in	the	




primary	 role	 in	 early	 object	 individuation	 processes.	 An	 interesting	 goal	 for	
future	studies	would	be	to	test	whether	the	infants’	pattern	of	responses	found	
in	the	present	study	could	be	generalized	also	to	scenarios	in	which	objects	differ	
in	 other	 motion	 cues.	 For	 example	 in	 a	 context	 in	 which	 the	 contrast	 is	 not	
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Developmental	 dyscalculia	 (DD)	 is	 a	 neurodevelopmental	 specific	 learning	
disability	 in	 arithmetic	 skills	 that	 is	 unrelated	 to	 low	 IQ	 and	 to	 inadequate	
schooling	and	its	prevalence	 is	estimated	ranging	from	3	to	6%	(Shalev,	2007).	
Although	 DD	 could	 present	 co-morbidity	 with	 other	 disorders	 (e.g.	 ADHD),	 in	
many	cases	it	occurs	separately	from	other	abilities,	such	as	reading	and	spelling.	
Dyscalculics	 can	 show	 a	 broad	 range	 of	 deficits	 that	 comprises	 difficulties	 in	
basic	 skills	 such	 as	 judging	 the	 greatest	 quantity	 or	 associating	magnitudes	 to	
symbols,	up	to	more	complex	abilities	such	as	mental	and	written	calculation.		
Multiple	hypotheses	have	been	proposed	 to	 address	 the	question	of	 the	
origins	 of	 DD.	 On	 one	 hand,	 some	 authors	 highlighted	 the	 possibility	 that	 DD	
originates	from	dysfunctioning	in	domain-specific	systems,	while	others	hold	the	





in	 the	 numerical	 components.	 In	 particular,	 two	 systems	 are	 considered	
fundamental	 in	 numerical	 processing,	 the	 Approximate	 Number	 System	 (ANS)	
for	the	estimation	of	 large	quantities	and	the	Object	Tracking	System	(OTS)	for	





Some	 authors	 found	 evidence	 for	 a	 link	 between	 DD	 and	 ANS.	 In	 these	





2010)	 and	 for	 a	 deficit	 in	 dots	 comparison	 task	 (Piazza	 et	 al.,	 2010).	 Although	
these	 studies	 demonstrated	 a	 specific	 deficit	 in	 the	 ANS	 acuity,	 others	 did	 not	




This	 line	of	research	found	deficits	 in	mastering	the	exact	number	of	objects	 in	
small	sets	(Desoete	&	Grégoire,	2006;	Moeller,	Neuburger,	Kaufmann,	Landerl,	&	
Nuerk,	 2009;	 Schleifer	 &	 Landerl,	 2011;	 van	 der	 Sluis	 et	 al.,	 2004),	 reporting	
steeper	 RTs	 slopes	 and	 more	 errors	 in	 counting	 up	 to	 three	 objects	 in	
dyscalculics	 than	 in	 controls,	 but	 similar	 performances	 for	 counting	 large	





As	 regard	 to	 dyscalculia,	 these	 authors	 hypothesized	 a	 specific	 deficit	 in	
enumerating	capacities	and	manipulating	exact	numerosities	but,	contrary	to	the	





Finally,	 another	 line	 of	 research	 supported	 the	 access	deficit	 hypothesis	
(Rousselle	 &	 Noël,	 2007).	 According	 to	 these	 authors,	 the	 core	 deficit	 of	 DD	
would	 consist	 in	 connecting	 symbols	with	 the	 corrisponding	 representation	 of	




In	sum,	while	 there	seems	 to	be	some	 indications	 that	 the	ANS	and	also	
potentially	the	OTS	may	be	dysfunctional	 in	dycalculia,	the	studies	have	lead	to	





ones.	 For	 example,	 we	 use	 WM	 for	 storing	 and	 manipulating	 information	 or	
inhibition	 skills	 for	 choosing	which	 aspects	of	 that	 information	are	 relevant	or	
not	 for	the	task	(Baddeley,	1986;	Miyake	et	al.,	2000).	Therefore,	some	authors	
tested	 the	 hypothesis	 that	 DD	 develops	 due	 to	 impairments	 in	 those	 domain	
general	mechanisms.		
	 	Several	 studies	 provided	 evidence	 for	 a	 deficit	 in	 visuo-spatial	 WM	
(Ashkenazi	et	al.,	2013;	Rotzer	et	al.,	2009;	for	its	role	in	ANS	acuity:	Bugden	&	
Ansari,	2016).	For	example,	Ashkenazi	and	colleagues	(2013)	examined	multiple	
components	 of	WM	 and	 they	 found	 that	 dyscalculics	 showed	 lower	 arithmetic	
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performances	 and	 lower	 scores	 on	 visuo-spatial	WM	 task.	 Other	 studies	 have	
focused	 their	attention	on	verbal	WM.	 In	particular,	poorly	performances	were	
shown	 in	 processing	 linguistic	 and	 numerical	 information	 in	 children	with	DD	
(e.g.	D’Amico	&	Guarnera,	2005;	Passolunghi	&	Siegel,	2001).		
	 Another	line	of	research	focused	the	attention	on	the	role	of	shifting	and	




each	 set	 they	 had	 to	 recall	 the	 final	 word	 of	 each	 sentence).	 The	 authors	
concluded	 that	 dyscalculics	 presented	 reduced	 capacities	 to	manage	 irrelevant	
information.	These	findings	were	also	suppored	by	another	study	(Szucs,	Devine,	
Soltesz,	 Nobes,	 &	 Gabriel,	 2013)	 where	 the	 authors	 demonstrated	 that	 visuo-
spatial	 short-	 term	 memory	 and	 inhibition	 impairements	 were	 the	 most	
important	dysfunctions	in	DD,	thus	supporting	the	hypothesis	that	DD	emerges	
as	a	consequence	of	impairments	in	domain-general	skills.		
	 All	 the	 aforementioned	 studies	 supported	 the	 hypothesis	 of	 a	 domain-
general	deficit.	Nevertheless,	the	results	in	this	field	appear	controversial.	Some	
studies	 found	 a	 specific	 deficit	 in	 visuo-spatial	 WM	 (Andersson,	 2010;	
Schuchardt,	 Maehler,	 &	 Hasselhorn,	 2008),	 whereas	 others	 failed	 to	 replicate	
such	 results	 (Andersson,	 2008b).	 Moreover,	 some	 authors	 reported	 normal	
inhibition	(Andersson	&	Lyxell,	2007)	and	shifting	abilities	(Andersson,	2010)	in	
dyscalculic	children.			
Finally,	 some	 authors	 support	 the	 heterogeneity	 of	 DD	 as	 a	 result	 of	
individual	 differences	 in	 development,	 where	 domain-general	 problems	 and	
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both	 the	 ANS	 and	 the	 OTS,	 b)	 the	 access	 hypothesis	 deficit	 by	 comparing	





















Thanks	 to	 the	 collaboration	 with	 the	 "Azienda	 Sanitaria	 Beato	 de	 Tschiderer"	
(Trento,	 Italy),	we	 selected	32	children	with	DD	or	difficulties	 in	mathematical	
acquisition.	 The	mathematical	 abilities	were	 assessed	 by	 administering	 one	 of	
the	following	tests:	the	Battery	for	the	assessment	of	Developmental	Dyscalculia	
(BDE-2;	 Biancardi,	 Bachmann,	 &	 Nicoletti,	 2016),	 that	 is	 divided	 into	 3	 areas,	
numerical	processing,	calculation	and	number	sense	or	the	AC-MT	test	(Cornoldi,	
Lucangeli,	&	Bellina,	2002),	a	standardized	arithmetic	battery	for	children	aged	6	
to	 11.	 Participants	 included	 in	 the	 sample	 presented	 either	 the	 diagnosis	 of	
dyscalculia	 or	 severe	 difficulties	 in	 mathematical	 and	 calculation	 domains.	
Further	 criteria	 were:	 general	 intelligence,	 assessed	 with	 the	 Wechsler	
Intelligence	 Scale	 for	 Children	 (WISC	 IV,	 Wechsler,	 1991),	 within	 the	 normal	







in	 the	 north	 of	 Italy).	 Controls	were	 administered	WISC’s	 subtests	 Similarities	
and	Matrix	Reasoning	and	their	scores	were	used	as	measures	of	verbal	and	non-
verbal	 IQ.	 The	 Similarities	 subtest	 measured	 logical	 and	 verbal	 thinking	 by	
asking	children	to	tell	how	two	objects	or	concepts	were	alike	or	different.	The	





matched	 to	 the	 group	 of	 dyscalculics	 for	 both	 age	 (t(62)	 =	 -.71,	 p	 =	 .48)	 and	











Participants	 were	 presented	 with	 pairs	 of	 arrays	 of	 black	 dots	 on	 white	
background,	presented	laterally	on	the	screen.	They	were	instructed	to	observe	
the	 two	arrays	 and	 to	 judge	without	 counting	 the	 greater	one,	 by	pressing	 the	


















were	presented	with	pairs	of	 stimuli,	 but	 contrary	 to	 the	 first	 task,	 the	 stimuli	
consisted	 in	digits	 from	1	 to	9.	Participants	were	asked	 to	decide	as	quickly	as	
possible	which	of	the	two	digits	was	the	largest.	Stimuli	remained	on	the	screen	
until	participants	pressed	a	response-key	on	the	mouse.	The	task	started	with	8	





Participants	were	presented	with	arrays	of	 colored	dots	appearing	 in	a	 central	
grey	circle	and	ranging	from	one	to	eight	(Fig.	1).	When	the	image	disappeared,	
participants	were	asked	 to	say	aloud	and	as	quickly	and	accurately	as	possible	
the	 precise	 number	 of	 dots.	 The	 responses	 were	 recorded	 via	 a	 michropone.	
Before	 starting	 the	 task,	 participants	 were	 instructed	 to	 pronounce	 numbers	
from	 one	 to	 eight	 in	 the	microphone;	 this	 part	was	 important	 to	 calibrate	 the	
microphone	 to	 the	 children’s	 voice	 pitch	 for	 each	 numerosity.	 Stimuli	 were	
controlled	for	size	and	total	occupied	area;	thus,	across	numerosities,	half	of	dots	
were	constant	in	dot	size	and	the	other	half	 in	dot	total	occupied	area,	to	make	
sure	 that	 participants’	 estimation	 was	 based	 on	 numerosity	 and	 not	 on	 other	
factors.		
The	task	comprised	10	training	trials,	followed	by	128	trials	divided	in	4	











Participants	were	 presented	with	 one	 image	 containing	 different	 colored	 dots,	
and	 then,	 after	 a	 1s	 interval,	 with	 a	 second	 image	 that	 could	 be	 identical	 or	
different	from	the	first	one;	each	image	was	composed	by	dots	from	1	to	8	(Fig.	
2).	 The	 images	 used	 for	 this	 task	 were	 identical	 to	 the	 ones	 used	 for	 the	
enumeration	task	described	above.	Participants	were	asked	to	perform	a	same-
different	 judgment	 aloud,	 while	 an	 experimenter	 pressed	 the	 corresponding	
answer	given	by	participants	on	the	keyboard.	In	half	of	the	tests	the	two	images	
were	the	same,	in	the	other	half	one	dot	changed	color.	The	experiment	started	
with	 10	 training	 trials,	 followed	 by	 128	 test	 trials	 divided	 in	 4	 blocks.	 Only	












but	not	 to	participants.	 	The	experimenter	was	seated	 in	 front	of	 the	child	and	
tapped	 the	 blocks	with	 the	 finger	 in	 sequence.	 Participants	were	 instructed	 to	


















In	 the	 non-symbolic	 comparison	 task,	we	 calculated	mean	 accuracy	 and	mean	
RTs	 for	 each	 participant.	 We	 also	 estimated	 the	 precision	 of	 the	 numerical	
representations	by	calculating	the	internal	Weber	fraction	(hereafter	w)	for	each	
participant	 that	 provides	 an	 index	 of	 the	 precision	 of	 the	 internal	 quantity	
representation	(Piazza	et	al.,	2004).	Assuming	the	hypothesis	that	numerosities	
are	 internally	 represented	 by	 a	 logarithmic	 internal	 number	 line	 with	 fixed	
Gaussian	 variability,	w	 corresponds	 to	 the	 standard	deviation	 of	 the	 estimated	
Gaussian	distribution	of	the	internal	numerical	representation	that	generates	the	
observed	performance.	Because	 this	measure	 is	 dependent	upon	model	 fitting,	
we	 excluded	 the	 subjects	 for	 which	 the	 model	 did	 not	 fit	 well	 (R2	 <	 0.2;	 for	
dyscalculics:	n=4;	for	controls:	n=2).	The	average	of	R2	for	dyscalculics	was	0.47,	
while	 for	 controls	was	0.57.	 Separated	 t-tests	 revealed	 that	 controls	presented	
significantly	higher	accuracy	 (Mcontr	 =	67.78,	SD	=	6.59;	Mdysc	 =	63.84,	SD	 =	7.8;	
t(62)	=	2.18,	p	<	 .05,	Fig.	3),	resulting	 in	a	smaller	w	 fraction	(Mcontr	=	 .24,	SD	=	


















between	 1	 and	 3	 the	 distance	was	 2).	 Regarding	 the	 accuracy	 (see	 Fig.	 5),	we	
observed	a	clear	differentiation	between	dyscalculics	and	controls	in	distances	1,	
2	 and	 3.	 Overall,	 dyscalculic	 children	 made	 significantly	 more	 errors	 than	
controls	 (accuracy:	Mcontr	=	 .97,	SD	=	 .02,	Mdysc	=	 .95,	SD	=	 .03;	 t(62)	=	2.75,	p	<	
.01).	 A	mixed	 ANOVA	with	 distance	 (1-8)	 as	 whitin-subjects	 factor	 and	 group	
(dyscalculics	 and	 controls)	 as	 between-subjects	 factor	 yielded	 main	 effect	 of	
distance	(F(7,434)	=	57.04,	p	<	.001,	η2G	=	.4)	and	group	(F(1,62)	=	8.94,	p	<	.01,	









Moreover,	 dyscalculics	 were	 slower	 than	 controls	 (Mcontr	 =	 920.04	 ms,	 SD	 =	
238.26	ms;	Mdysc	=	1139.2	ms,	SD	=	321.49	ms;	t(62)	=	3.09,	p	<	 .01,	see	Fig.	6).	
We	performed	a	mixed	ANOVA	with	distance	as	within-subjects	factor	and	group	
as	 between-subjects	 factor.	 We	 found	 significant	 main	 effects	 of	 distance	
(F(7,434)	=	53.7,	p	<	.001,	η2G	=	.1),	group	(F(1,62)	=	10.07,	p	<	.01,	η2G	=	.12)	and	







We	 first	 calculated	 mean	 accuracy	 and	 mean	 RTs	 overall,	 and	 then	 for	 each	
numerosity	(1-8).	Overall,	dyscalculics	were	less	accurate	than	controls	(t(62)	=	
2.17,	 p	 <	 .05)	 but	 they	 did	 not	 differ	 in	 RTs	 (t(62)	 =	 -1.95,	 p	 =	 .056).	 We	
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performed	 separated	 analyses	 for	 1-3	 (subitizing	 range)	 and	 4-7	3(counting	
range).	 The	 subitizing	 range	 was	 set	 a	 priori	 to	 3	 following	 the	 previous	
literature	 on	 subitizing	 in	 dyscalculics.	 However,	 we	 also	 confirmed	 it	 by	
analyzing	 the	data	 from	our	 control	 subjects	 that	 the	 “typical”	 subitizing	 range	
across	 subjects	 was	 3:	 we	 conducted	 pairwise	 comparisons	 among	 the	
successive	numerosities	 (1	vs.	2;	2	vs.	3;	3	vs.	4)	and	we	 found	 that	significant	
differences	 in	 accuracy	 appeared	 only	 between	 3	 and	 4	 (3	 vs.	 4:	 p<	 .01,	 all	
previous	pairwise	comparisons	p	>	.05).	We	thus	proceded	performing	separated	
analyses	 for	 the	 1-3	 (subitizing	 range)	 and	 4-7	 (counting	 range)	 trials.	 Across	
groups,	there	were	no	significant	differences	in	accuracy	(Mcontr	=	.99,	Mdysc	=	.98;	
t(62)	=	-1.3,	p	=	.197)	and	RTs	(Mcontr	=	.42	s,	Mdysc	=	.39	s;	t(62)	=	-.86,	p	=	.39)	in	

























responses	 by	 the	 mean	 for	 each	 group	 (Ashkenazi	 et	 al.,	 2013;	 Gallistel	 &	
Gelman,	 2000;	 Mazzocco	 et	 al.,	 2011).	 This	 index	 is	 approximately	 constant	
across	 variations	 in	 magnitude	 for	 scalar	 magnitude	 representations,	 and	 its	
value	 is	 a	 measure	 of	 the	 errors’	 extent.	 We	 found	 no	 significant	 differences	








Finally,	 following	 Reigosa-Crespo	 et	 al.,	 (2013),	 we	 also	 calculated	 the	
efficiency	measure	(EM).	The	EM	is	an	index	that	combines	RTs	and	accuracy	and	
it	is	calculated	by	extracting	the	mean	of	correct	reaction	times	for	numerosity	1	
and	 3	 (or	 5	 and	 7	 for	 the	 counting	 range)	 for	 all	 participants	 and	 by	 dividing	
them	by	 accuracy.	Then,	 the	EM	of	numerosity	1	 is	 subtracted	 from	 the	EM	of	
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Overall	mean	accuracy	and	mean	RTs	were	measured	 for	 each	participant	 and	




	 Children	with	DD	had	an	overall	 significantly	poorer	performances	 than	
controls	both	 in	accuracy	and	 in	RTs	(accuracy:	Mcontr	=	 .81,	Mdysc	=	 .76;	t(62)	=	
3.86,	p	<	.001;	RTs:	Mcontr	=	870.59	ms,	Mdysc	=	1072.02	ms;	t(62)	=	2.47,	p	<	.05).	
We	 also	 found	 a	 strong	 group	 difference	 considering	 Cowan’s	 K	 (Mcontr	 =	
	 2.26,	Mdysc	 =	 1.76;	 t(62)	 =	 3.85,	 p	 <	 .001).	 As	 shown	 in	 Figure	 10,	 the	









Separated	 analyses	 were	 performed	 for	 Corsi	 task	 “forward”	 and	 “backward”.	







The	 present	 study	 aims	 to	 compare	 different	 hypotheses	 that	 have	 tried	 to	
propose	 at	 the	 origins	 of	 DD.	 In	 particular,	 given	 the	 tests	 we	 used,	 we	 can	
compare	 domain-specific	 and	 domain-general	 hypotheses.	 Within	 the	 former	
approach,	different	 theories	predict	either	a	defective	ANS	and	a	non-impaired	
OTS	(see	Piazza,	2010),	or	defective	both	ANS	and	OTS	(Butterworth,	2010),	or	
problems	 in	binding	non-symbolic	 representations	 to	symbolic	ones	 (Rousselle	
&	 Noël,	 2007).	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 the	 theories	 whithin	 the	 latter	 approach	
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predict	a	selective	 impairment	 in	more	general	cognitive	abilities,	 such	as	WM,	
visuo-spatial	 WM	 and	 inhibitory	 skills.	 In	 the	 present	 study,	 we	 assessed	 32	
children	 with	 dyscalculia	 and	 controls	 in	 multiple	 tasks:	 symbolic	 and	 non-
symbolic	comparison	task,	enumeration	task,	visual	STM	and	WM.		
	 	Previous	 studies	have	 found	evidence	 for	 a	defective	ANS	 (Mazzocco	et	
al.,	 2011;	 Mussolin	 et	 al.,	 2010;	 Piazza	 et	 al.,	 2010)	 and	 we	 replicated	 such	
results.	 Children	 without	 DD	 showed	 better	 performances	 in	 comparing	 non-
symbolic	numerosities	(dyscalculics:	w	=	0.32;	controls:	w	=	0.24).	These	findings	
closely	replicated	those	by	Piazza	et	al.	(2010)	reporting	an	internal	w	fraction	of	
0.34	 for	dyscalculics	 and	0.25	 for	 controls	of	 similar	 age.	Moreover,	 as	 already	





internal	 representation	 of	 quantities.	 This	 result	 is	 at	 odd	 with	 theories	 that	
advocate	a	pure	domain	general	origin	of	DD.		
	 A	 second	 important	 finding	 was	 the	 significant	 impairment	 in	 the	 one-






significantly	more	 time	 to	decide	which	 symbol	was	 the	greatest.	The	 fact	 that	
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support	 the	 idea	 that	 children	with	DD	present	 a	 specific	deficit	 in	 the	precise	
and	 exact	 estimation	 of	 small	 sets	 (within	 the	 subitizing	 range).	 In	 our	 study,	
children	with	DD	present	no	deficit	in	tracking	up	to	three	objects,	whereas	they	
show	more	difficulties	to	identify	larger	quantities	in	the	counting	range.	These	
results	 are	 therefore	 not	 in	 line	with	 the	OTS	 hypothesis	 and	with	 the	 studies	
that	 support	a	 specific	deficit	 in	manipulating	exact	quantities	 representations.	
However,	the	discrepancy	with	previous	studies	could	be	due	to	the	differences	
in	 the	 task	 used.	 Indeed,	 our	 enumeration	 task	 was	 limited	 in	 time	 (children	
observed	 the	 images	with	colored	dots	 for	500	ms)	while	 in	other	 studies	 that	






WM,	 both	 measured	 through	 our	 computerized	 change	 detection	 task	 and	
through	the	classical	Corsi	block	test.	In	the	first	one,	participants	were	asked	to	
observe	 two	 images	 and	 to	 perform	 a	 same-different	 judgment,	 while	 in	 the	




consistent	 with	 previous	 studies	 that	 provided	 evidence	 of	 a	 defective	 visuo-
spatial	 short-term	 memory	 (e.g.	 Szucs	 et	 al.,	 2013).	 It	 is	 plausible	 that	
impairments	 in	 visuo-spatial	 components	 would	 also	 affect	 performances	 in	
mathematical	 cognition.	 Indeed,	 many	 studies	 demonstrated	 its	 key	 role	 in	
calculation	 and	 arithmetic	 problem	 solving	 (e.g.	 Bull	 &	 Sherif,	 2001;	 Furst	 &	




in	 children	 with	 DD.	 Our	 findings	 only	 partially	 support	 the	 access	 deficit	
hypothesis	 by	 showing	 severe	 difficulties	 in	 symbolic	 comparison	 tasks	 in	DD,	
but	these	comprise	also	non-symbolic	magnitude	representations.	On	the	other	
hand,	 results	 are	 not	 consistent	with	 the	OTS	hypothesis,	 because	 participants	
with	DD	 in	our	study	did	not	 indicate	a	selective	deficit	 in	 the	subitizing	range	
but	a	general	weakness	in	the	counting	range	instead.	Considering	our	data,	DD	
should	be	connected	to	multiple	deficits	rather	then	a	single	core	deficit	and	this	





































































The	 present	 work	 aims	 to	 extend	 our	 knowledge	 regarding	 the	 core	
systems	 of	 numerical	 cognition.	 In	 particular,	 the	 attention	 is	 focused	 on	 two	
systems	grounding	the	numerical	cognition,	one	for	the	approximate	magnitude	
representation	 (Approximate	 Number	 System/ANS)	 and	 the	 other	 for	 the	
precise	 estimation	 of	 small	 sets	 of	 objects	 (Object	 Tracking	 System/OTS).	 This	
collection	 of	 works	 investigates	 specific	 aspects	 of	 these	 two	 systems.	 On	 one	
hand	I	have	assessed	the	ratio-dependence	of	ANS,	on	the	other	hand,	in	parallel,	
the	perception	of	 faces	 in	 infancy.	 This	 chapter	 is	 relevant	 as	 a	 first	 step	 for	 a	
better	 understanding	 of	 ANS	 acuity	 in	 infancy.	 Moreover	 I	 implemented	 a	
modified	 version	 of	 the	 change	 detection	 paradigm,	 already	 used	 for	
numerosities	but	never	for	faces	(our	control	task	of	the	longitudinal	study).	In	
addition,	parents’	performance	was	measured	for	investigating	its	role	in	infants’	
performances.	This	part	enhances	the	knowledge	about	 the	ANS	 in	 infancy	and	
about	 the	 influence	 of	 parents	 in	 these	 two	 abilities.	 The	 latter	 hypothesis	 is	
particularly	 interesting	due	to	 the	 fact	 that	only	one	study	has	 investigated	the	
correlation	 between	 children	 -	 parents	 ANS	 acuity;	 this	 is	 true	 also	 for	 face	





about	 the	 OTS	 in	 infancy.	 A	 crucial	 question	 concerns	 the	 kind	 of	 information	
infants	needs	to	individuate	and	track	different	objects.	Specifically,	I	tested	the	
hypothesis	 that	 dynamic	 information	 is	 enough	 to	 create	 specific	 numerical	




Finally,	 another	 important	 aspect	 to	 be	 explored	 is	 the	 role	 of	 ANS	 and	
OTS	in	DD.	Some	authors	found	a	specific	deficit	of	ANS	in	dyscalculic	children,	
while	 others	 demonstrated	 a	 specific	 deficit	 in	 OTS.	 In	 parallel,	 other	 studies	









differences	 in	numerical	discrimination.	 Infants	observed	two	arrays	of	dots,	 in	
one	of	them	the	numerosity	changes	over	time	while	in	the	other	the	numerosity	
remains	 fixed.	We	explored	 infants’	numerical	acuity	using	multiple	 ratios	 (1:4	
and	 1:2)	 and	we	 also	 tested	 the	 reliability	 of	 the	measures	 obtained	with	 this	
paradigm.	 In	 line	 with	 previous	 studies,	 our	 results	 provided	 evidence	 that	
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we	didn’t	 find	 a	 significant	 reliability	between	 the	 two	 levels	 of	 difficulty.	This	
discrepancy	with	 the	previous	study	could	be	due	to	differences	 in	 the	method	
that	 we	 used	 compared	 to	 previous	 studies	 (e.g.	 Libertus	 et	 al.,	 2010),	 to	 the	
choice	 of	 the	 ratios	 or	 to	 the	 low	 variability	 across	 subjects	 in	 one	 of	 the	 two	
condition	(1:4	ratio).		
In	 parallel,	we	 have	 also	 assessed	 the	 infants’	 face	 perception	 ability	 as	
control	 task	of	 the	 longitudinal	study.	We	decided	 to	 test	 face	perception	 to	be	
sure	that	 in	case	of	significant	positive	correlation	at	T2,	 this	could	be	 liable	 to	
differences	 in	 discrimination	 of	 quantities	 and	 not	 to	more	 general	 perceptual	
abilities.	12-month-old	infants	were	tested	with	the	same	paradigm	used	in	the	
numerical	part	except	that	infants	observed	face	images.	Our	results	showed	that	
infants	 can	 perceive	 not	 only	 featural	 differences	 (sensitivity	 to	 the	 shape	 of	
eyes,	 nose	 and	 mouth)	 but	 also	 second-order	 differences	 (sensitivity	 to	 the	
distance	 among	 these	 features).	 Moreover,	 we	 demonstrated	 the	 significant	
positive	 correlation	 between	 these	 levels	 of	 difficulty,	 indicating	 that	 our	
stimuli/design	 provide	 a	 stable	 and	 sensitive	 estimates	 on	 inter-individual	
variability	in	face	perception	skills.		
At	the	same	study	we	have	also	explored,	and	here	for	the	first	time,	the	
link	 between	parents’	 and	 infants’	 abilities	 in	 these	 two	domains:	 number	 and	
face	perception.	Regarding	 the	numerical	acuity,	parents	were	administered	an	




in	 the	1:4	ratio	nor	 in	 the	1:2	ratio.	Given	previous	 findings	demonstrating	 the	
association	 between	 parents	 and	 children	 of	 5-8	 years	 old	 in	 ANS	 acuity,	 it	 is	
plausible	 to	 support	 the	 idea	 that	 environmental	 factors	 influence	 children	
performances	 later	 in	development.	Future	studies	could	systematically	extend	
the	present	investigation	regarding	the	relation	between	parents	and	children	in	
ANS	 acuity.	 Indeed,	 only	 one	 recent	 study	 has	 already	 explored	 this	 line	 of	
research	 (Braham	 &	 Libertus,	 2016)	 and	 many	 questions	 remain	 open.	 One	
project	 could	 test	 this	 link	 at	 different	 ages,	 observing	when	 this	 link	 appears	
and	which	variables	influence	the	children’s	performances	at	each	age.		
Regarding	 face	 processing,	we	 have	 assessed	 parents	 in	 a	 face	memory	
test	(CFMT;	Duchaine	&	Nakayama,	2006),	where	participants	were	instructed	to	
memorize	 faces	 and	 then	 tested	 with	 a	 three-alternative	 forced	 choice	 task,	
where	 one	 of	 them	was	 the	 right	 face.	 Findings	 revealed	 a	 significant	 relation	
between	 fathers	 (and	 not	 mothers)	 and	 infants	 when	 considering	 infant’s	
preference	score	in	the	featural	change.	This	very	interesting	result	needs	to	be	





In	chapter	2,	 I	 reported	a	study	 that	 investigated	 the	OTS	and	 in	particular	 the	
process	that	allows	tracking	and	locating	small	sets	through	space	and	time.	We	





observed	 one	 object	 appearing	 from	 behind	 one	 side	 of	 a	 screen	 and	moving	
autonomously;	 then	 at	 the	 opposite	 side	 an	 identical	 object	 was	 grasped	 by	 a	
hand,	dropped	on	the	floor	and	pushed	again	behind	the	screen.	The	screen	was	
removed	 revealing	 either	 one	 or	 two	 objects.	 For	 the	 first	 time	 we	 provided	
evidence	 for	 a	 relevant	 role	 of	 dynamic	 information	 in	 individuation	 process.	
Indeed,	 the	most	 important	 finding	was	 that	 infants	before	 the	end	of	 the	 first	
year	 of	 life	 can	 individuate	 different	 objects	 only	 considering	 the	 autonomous	
and	passive	motion.		





AGENT	 and	 INERT	 OBJECT.	 They	 are	 also	 consistent	 with	 previous	 studies	 of	
Bonatti	and	colleagues.	These	authors	demonstrated	that	infants	as	young	as	10-
months	could	individuate	two	objects	not	only	when	they	compared	humanlike	






returning	behind	 it	 (Surian	&	Caldi,	 2010).	One	object	 showed	an	 autonomous	
movement	 (e.g.,	 a	 green	 caterpillar)	while	 the	 other	 one	 had	 a	 passive	motion	
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and	 was	 grasped	 and	 dropped	 by	 a	 hand	 (e.g.,	 a	 red	 cup).	 At	 the	 end	 of	 this	
familiarization,	 the	 screen	 was	 raised,	 revealing	 one-object	 or	 two-objects	
outcome.	 Participants	 looked	 longer	 at	 the	 one-object	 outcome,	 showing	 the	
violation	of	expectation.	
Our	study	posits	some	considerations	for	the	neuropsychological	models	
postulated	 for	 the	 individuation	 process.	 Considering	 the	 model	 of	 Leslie	 and	
colleagues	 (1998),	 infants	 can	 assign	 a	 mental	 index	 to	 an	 object,	 and	 this	
process	 is	 supported	 first	 by	 spatiotemporal	 information	 (‘where’	 route)	 and	
only	later	in	the	development	by	featural	cues	(‘what’	route);	the	two	pathways	
would	be	completely	connected	at	the	end	of	the	first	year	of	life.	However,	our	
results	 demonstrated	 that	 infants	 before	 12	 months	 can	 assign	 two	 different	
indexes	when	dynamic	information	is	available.	
One	explanation	could	be	found	in	the	idea	of	a	major	contribution	of	the	





inert/self-propelled	 objects	 (Luo	 et	 al.,	 2009;	 Saxe	 et	 al.,	 2007).	 In	 a	 series	 of	
experiments	(Luo	et	al.,	2009),	the	authors	found	that	infants	of	5-6.5	months	old	
can	 have	 expectations	 about	 physical	 events	 involving	 inert	 and	 self-propelled	
objects,	 for	example	 infants	are	surprised	when	an	 inert	box	changes	direction	
autonomously.	Baillargeon	and	colleagues	(2012)	proposed	a	model	supporting	
the	 idea	 that	 infants	 are	 equipped	 with	 a	 system	 that	 allows	 them	 to	 reason	
about	 objects’	 physical	 events.	 When	 infants	 observe	 an	 event,	 a	 physical	
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representation	 of	 it	 is	 created	 with	 one	 structural	 layer,	 that	 contains	
spatiotemporal	and	general/categorical	 information	(such	as	self-propelled	and	
inert	 object),	 and	 one	 variable	 layer,	 that	 contains	 more	 specific	 information	
about	the	event	(such	as	shape,	size,	color	etc.).	The	 individuation	process	 fails	
when	 the	 two	 layers	 include	 diverging	 information.	 The	model	 postulates	 that	
both	 layers	 can	 be	 already	 used	 by	 infants	 at	 10	 months	 and	 in	 case	 of	
discrepancies	between	the	two	layers,	infants	should	be	unable	to	create	precise	
numerical	expectations.	Thus,	considering	this	model,	infants	in	our	study	should	
not	 have	 specific	 numerical	 expectations.	 Indeed,	 two	 objects’	 expectation	 is	
created	 in	 the	 structural	 layer,	 due	 to	 different	 categorical	 descriptors	 (self-
propelled	 ball	 and	 inert	 ball),	 but	 only	 one	 object	 expectation	 in	 the	 variable	
layer,	due	to	the	identical	perceptual	 information.	By	contrast,	 infants	correctly	
individuate	two	objects.		
Interestingly,	 infants	 and	 adults	 presented	 different	 pattern	 in	 object	
individuation.	Infants’	expectation	was	consistent	with	the	structural	layer,	while	
adults’	expectation	was	more	based	on	the	variable	layer.		
In	 sum,	 our	 results	 indicate	 that	 infants	 of	 10	 months	 can	 individuate	
separately	 animate	 and	 inanimate	 objects,	 supporting	 the	 assumption	 that	
animacy	 plays	 a	 relevant	 role	 in	 individuation	 process	 in	 the	 first	 steps	 of	
development.	Future	studies	should	deepen	this	aspect	by	testing	with	the	same	







In	 the	third	chapter,	 I	reported	a	study	that	aims	to	clarify	 the	role	of	ANS	and	
OTS	in	dyscalculia	and	to	compare	different	hypotheses	that	have	tried	to	explain	
this	neurodevelopmental	disorder.	As	we	have	seen	in	the	General	Introduction,	
it	 is	 unclear	 the	 influence	 of	 each	 system	 on	 dyscalculia	 and	 findings	 in	 the	
literature	 reported	 contradictory	 results.	 We	 compared	 performances	 of	




	 	Firstly,	 we	 found	 a	 defective	 ANS	 in	 dyscalculic	 children	 and	 we	




We	 provided	 evidence	 for	 a	 defective	 ANS	 in	 dyscalculics	 and	 for	 a	 distinct	
trajectory	 of	 development	 of	 this	 ability	 in	 the	 two	 groups.	 Indeed,	 controls	
presented	a	 lower	w	 fraction	compared	to	dyscalculic	children.	However,	 there	
are	no	differences	 in	RTs	 from	typically	developing	children.	Thus,	dyscalculics	
seem	 to	 have	 different	 internal	 representations	 of	 quantities,	 rather	 than	
different	strategies	to	identify	the	greater	numerosity.		
With	 respect	 to	 the	 assessment	 of	 the	 OTS,	 we	 administered	 an	
enumeration	task	where	children	were	asked	to	name	aloud	the	exact	number	of	
dots	 presented.	 Overall,	 we	 found	 differences	 between	 the	 two	 groups	 in	
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accuracy	 and	 RTs.	 However,	 further	 analyses	 revealed	 impairments	 in	 the	
counting	range	(4-7)	and	not	in	the	subitzing	range	(1-3),	even	if	we	explicitely	
used	 several	 measures	 to	 try	 and	 be	 sensitive	 to	 even	 small	 potential	 across	
groups	difference.	Contrary	 to	previous	studies	 (Andersson	&	Östergren,	2012;	
Schleifer	 &	 Landerl,	 2011)	 our	 findings	 did	 not	 support	 the	 idea	 of	 a	 specific	
deficit	 in	 the	 precise	 estimation	 within	 the	 subitizing	 range	 in	 DD.	 Indeed,	
children	with	DD	present	no	problems	in	tracking	up	to	three	elements	at	time,	
whereas	 they	exhibit	 severe	difficulties	 to	 identify	 larger	quantities.	Therefore,	





from	 symbols”	 (Rousselle	&	Noel,	 2007).	 Convergent	with	 this	 hypothesis,	 our	
data	displayed	a	significant	deficit	in	the	symbolic	comparison	task,	but	contrary	
to	it	these	deficits	are	not	limited	to	symbolic	quantities.	As	we	have	already	seen	
children	 with	 dyscalculia	 presented	 impairments	 in	 the	 non-symbolic	
comparison	task.		
Interestingly,	 dyscalculics	 showed	 worse	 performances	 when	 the	
distances	between	two	symbols	were	very	low	(i.e.	1,2	and	3),	suggesting	a	major	
overlap	 between	 symbols	 in	 dyscalculia	 than	 in	 typically	 development.	 These	
findings	can	be	 taken	as	evidence	 that	 the	deficit	 in	accessing	 to	 the	numerical	
meaning	 of	 symbols	 cannot	 be	 considered	 the	 unique	 and	 more	 severe	 core	
deficit	of	DD.		
	 	Finally,	 we	 took	 into	 account	 more	 domain-general	 hypotheses,	
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comparing	 the	 two	 groups	 in	 a	 STM	 task	 and	 in	 a	WM	 task	 (Corsi	 block	 test).	
Dyscalculics	were	less	accurate	and	slower	in	RTs	than	controls	when	they	had	
to	 compare	 two	 images	 with	 colored	 dots	 and	 when	 we	 asked	 them	 to	 tap	 a	
sequence	of	blocks	previously	touched	by	the	experimenter.	We	argued	that	they	
probably	 present	 general	 cognitive	 deficits	 that	 involve	 storage	 and	









WM.	 We	 argued	 that,	 considering	 our	 data,	 DD	 should	 be	 linked	 to	 multiple	
deficits	 rather	 then	 a	 single	 core	 deficit.	 (Wilson	 &	 Dehaene,	 2007;	 Dowker,	
2005;	Rubinsten	&	Henik,	2009;	Andersson	&	Östergren,	2012).	
	 	Future	research	should	focus	their	attention	on	the	multiple	diagnosis	of	




































set	 both	 by	 visual	 information	 load	 and	 by	 number	 of	 objects.	 Psychological	
science,	15(2),	106-111.	









basic	 cognitive	 functions:	 Findings	 from	 a	 three-year	 longitudinal	 study	 of	
children	 with	 different	 types	 of	 learning	 difficulties.	 Journal	 of	 Educational	
Psychology,	102,	115–134.		
Andersson,	 U.,	 &	 Lyxell,	 B.	 (2007).	 Working	 memory	 deficit	 in	 children	 with	
mathematical	difficulties:	A	general	or	specific	deficit?.	Journal	of	experimental	
child	psychology,	96(3),	197-228.	
Andersson,	 U.,	 &	 Östergren,	 R.	 (2012).	 Number	 magnitude	 processing	 and	 basic	





categorical	 perception,	 and	 asymmetry	 in	 infants’	 representation	 of	 face	
race.	Developmental	science,	13(4),	553-564.	
Ashkenazi,	 S.,	 Black,	 J.	 M.,	 Abrams,	 D.	 A.,	 Hoeft,	 F.,	 &	 Menon,	 V.	 (2013).	
Neurobiological	 underpinnings	 of	 math	 and	 reading	 learning	
disabilities.	Journal	of	learning	disabilities,	46(6),	549-569.	
Ashkenazi,	 S.,	 Mark-Zigdon,	 N.,	 &	 Henik,	 A.	 (2009).	 Numerical	 distance	 effect	 in	
developmental	dyscalculia.	Cognitive	Development,	24(4),	387-400.	
Ashkenazi,	S.,	Rosenberg-Lee,	M.,	Metcalfe,	A.	W.,	Swigart,	A.	G.,	&	Menon,	V.	(2013).	





A.	 (2012).	 Object	 individuation	 and	 physical	 reasoning	 in	 infancy:	 An	
integrative	account.	Language	Learning	and	Development,	8(1),	4-46.	
Behrmann,	 M.,	 &	 Avidan,	 G.	 (2005).	 Congenital	 prosopagnosia:	 face-blind	 from	
birth.	Trends	in	cognitive	sciences,	9(4),	180-187.	
Bertin,	 E.,	 &	 Bhatt,	 R.	 S.	 (2004).	 The	 Thatcher	 illusion	 and	 face	 processing	 in	
infancy.	Developmental	science,	7(4),	431-436.	
Bhatt,	 R.	 S.,	 Bertin,	 E.,	 Hayden,	 A.,	 &	 Reed,	 A.	 (2005).	 Face	 processing	 in	 infancy:	





Evolutiva	 [Battery	 for	 the	 assessment	 of	 Developmental	 Dyscalculia].	 Trento,	
Italy:	Erickson.		
Blevins-Knabe,	 B.,	 Whiteside-Mansell,	 L.,	 &	 Selig,	 J.	 (2007).	 Parenting	 and	
mathematical	development.	Academic	Exchange	Quarterly,	11	(2),	76–81.		
Bonatti,	 L.,	 Frot,	 E.,	 Zangl,	 R.,	 &	 Mehler,	 J.	 (2002).	 The	 human	 first	 hypothesis:	
Identification	 of	 conspecifics	 and	 individuation	 of	 objects	 in	 the	 young	
infant.	Cognitive	psychology,	44(4),	388-426.	
Bonatti,	 L.	 L.,	 Frot,	 E.,	 &	 Mehler,	 J.	 (2005).	 What	 face	 inversion	 does	 to	 infants'	
counting	abilities.	Psychological	Science,	16(7),	506-510.	




approximation	 and	 mathematical	 abilities.	Developmental	 science,	20(5),	
e12436.	




Brown,	S.,	Mcintosh,	 S.,	&	Taylor,	K.	 (2011).	Following	 in	your	parents’	 footsteps?	
Empirical	analysis	of	matched	parent–	offspring	 test	 scores.	Oxford	Bulletin	of	
Economics	and	Statistics,	73	(1),	40–58.		






sketch	 pad	 and	 central	 executive	 in	 children's	 arithmetical	 skills:	 Views	 from	
cognition	 and	 developmental	 neuropsychology.	Developmental	
neuropsychology,	15(3),	421-442.	
Bull,	 R.,	 &	 Sherif,	 G.	 (2001).	 Executive	 functioning	 as	 a	 predictor	 of	 children’s	
mathematics	 ability:	 Inhibition,	 switching,	 and	 working	 memory.	
Developmental	Neuropsychology,	19,	273–293.	
Bukach,	 C.	 M.,	 Grand,	 R.,	 Kaiser,	 M.	 D.,	 Bub,	 D.	 N.,	 &	 Tanaka,	 J.	 W.	 (2008).	
Preservation	of	mouth	region	processing	in	two	cases	of	prosopagnosia.	Journal	
of	Neuropsychology,	2(1),	227-244.	
Burr,	 D.	 C.,	 Turi,	 M.,	 &	 Anobile,	 G.	 (2010).	 Subitizing	 but	 not	 estimation	 of	
numerosity	requires	attentional	resources.	Journal	of	Vision,	10(6),	1-10.	






(2014).	 Enumeration	 of	 small	 and	 large	 numerosities	 in	 adolescents	 with	
mathematical	 learning	 disorders.	Research	 in	 developmental	 disabilities,	35(1),	
27-35.	
Chinello,	 A.,	 Cattani,	 V.,	 Bonfiglioli,	 C.,	 Dehaene,	 S.,	 &	 Piazza,	 M.	 (2013).	 Objects,	









Cornoldi,	 C.,	 Lucangeli,	 D.,	 &	 Bellina,	 M.	 (2002).	AC-MT:	 test	 di	 valutazione	 delle	
abilità	di	calcolo-gruppo	MT.	Centro	Studi	Erickson.	
Corsi,	 P.M.	 (1972).	 Human	 memory	 and	 the	 medial	 temporal	 region	 of	 the	 brain.	
Unpublished	Thesis.	Montreal:	McGill	University.		
Cowan,	 N.	 (2001).	 Metatheory	 of	 storage	 capacity	 limits.	Behavioral	 and	 brain	
sciences,	24(1),	154-176.	





D'Amico,	 A.,	 &	 Guarnera,	M.	 (2005).	 Exploring	working	memory	 in	 children	with	
low	 arithmetical	 achievement.	Learning	and	 Individual	Differences,	15(3),	 189-
202.	
Dehaene,	 S.	 (1997).	 The	 number	 sense:	How	 the	mind	 creates	mathematics.	New	
York,	NY:	Oxford	University	Press.	
De	Smedt,	B.,	&	Gilmore,	C.	K.	(2011).	Defective	number	module	or	impaired	access?	





children	 with	 mathematics	 learning	 disabilities.	Learning	 and	 individual	
differences,	16(4),	351-367.	
Dowker,	A.	 (2005).	Individual	differences	 in	arithmetic:	 Implications	for	psychology,	
neuroscience	and	education.	Psychology	Press.	
Duchaine,	B.,	Germine,	L.,	&	Nakayama,	K.	(2007).	Family	resemblance:	Ten	family	
members	 with	 prosopagnosia	 and	 within-class	 object	 agnosia.	Cognitive	
neuropsychology,	24(4),	419-430.	
Duchaine,	B.,	&	Nakayama,	K.	(2006).	The	Cambridge	Face	Memory	Test:	Results	for	
neurologically	 intact	 individuals	 and	 an	 investigation	 of	 its	 validity	 using	
inverted	 face	 stimuli	 and	prosopagnosic	participants.	Neuropsychologia,	44(4),	
576-585.	
Dufour,	V.,	Coleman,	M.,	Campbell,	R.,	Petit,	O.,	&	Pascalis,	O.	(2004).	On	the	species-







chances:	 Family	 background	 and	 economic	 success	 (pp.	 23–79).	 Princeton,	 NJ:	
Princeton	University	Press.		
Elliott,	 L.,	 Braham,	 E.	 J.,	 &	 Libertus,	 M.	 E.	 (2017).	 Understanding	 sources	 of	




Fazio,	 L.	 K.,	 Bailey,	 D.	 H.,	 Thompson,	 C.	 A.,	 &	 Siegler,	 R.	 S.	 (2014).	 Relations	 of	
different	 types	 of	 numerical	magnitude	 representations	 to	 each	 other	 and	 to	




Feigenson,	 L.,	 &	 Carey,	 S.	 (2003).	 Tracking	 individuals	 via	 object‐files:	 evidence	
from	infants’	manual	search.	Developmental	Science,	6(5),	568-584.	
Feigenson,	 L.,	 Carey,	 S.,	 &	 Hauser,	 M.	 (2002).	 The	 representations	 underlying	




Freire,	 A.,	 &	 Lee,	 K.	 (2001).	 Face	 recognition	 in	 4-to	 7-year-olds:	 Processing	 of	
configural,	 featural,	 and	 paraphernalia	 information.	 Journal	 of	 experimental	
child	psychology,	80(4),	347-371.	
Furst,	 A.	 J.,	 &	 Hitch,	 G.	 J.	 (2000).	 Separate	 roles	 for	 executive	 and	 phonological	
components	 of	 working	 memory	 in	 mental	 arithmetic.	Memory	 &	
cognition,	28(5),	774-782.	
Futó,	 J.,	 Téglás,	 E.,	 Csibra,	 G.,	 &	 Gergely,	 G.	 (2010).	 Communicative	 function	












Gelman,	 R.,	 &	 Gallistel,	 C.	 R.	 (2004).	 Language	 and	 the	 origin	 of	 numerical	
concepts.	Science,	306(5695),	441-443.	




















Hart,	 S.A.,	 Petrill,	 S.A.,	 Thompson,	 L.A.,	 &	 Plomin,	 R.	 (2009).	 The	 ABCs	 of	math:	 a	
genetic	analysis	of	mathematics	and	 its	 links	with	 reading	ability	and	general	
cognitive	ability.	Journal	of	Educational	Psychology,	101	(2),	388–402.		
Hayden,	 A.,	 Bhatt,	 R.	 S.,	 Reed,	 A.,	 Corbly,	 C.	 R.,	 &	 Joseph,	 J.	 E.	 (2007).	 The	
development	 of	 expert	 face	 processing:	 Are	 infants	 sensitive	 to	 normal	
differences	 in	 second-order	 relational	 information?.	Journal	 of	 Experimental	
Child	Psychology,	97(2),	85-98.	
Holloway,	I.	D.,	&	Ansari,	D.	(2009).	Mapping	numerical	magnitudes	onto	symbols:	
The	 numerical	 distance	 effect	 and	 individual	 differences	 in	 children’s	
mathematics	achievement.	Journal	of	experimental	child	psychology,	103(1),	17-
29.	






correlates	 with	 symbolic	 mathematics	 achievement:	 But	 only	 in	
children.	Psychonomic	bulletin	&	review,	18(6),	1222-1229.	
Iuculano,	 T.,	 Tang,	 J.,	 Hall,	 C.	 W.,	 &	 Butterworth,	 B.	 (2008).	 Core	 information	




Izard,	 V.,	 Sann,	 C.,	 Spelke,	 E.	 S.,	 &	 Streri,	 A.	 (2009).	 Newborn	 infants	 perceive	
abstract	 numbers.	Proceedings	 of	 the	 National	 Academy	 of	 Sciences,	106(25),	
10382-10385.	
Kaufmann,	L.,	Mazzocco,	M.	M.,	Dowker,	A.,	von	Aster,	M.,	Goebel,	S.,	Grabner,	R.,	&	
Rubinsten,	 O.	 (2013).	 Dyscalculia	 from	 a	 developmental	 and	 differential	
perspective.	Frontiers	in	psychology,	4,	516.	
Kelly,	D.	J.,	Quinn,	P.	C.,	Slater,	A.	M.,	Lee,	K.,	Ge,	L.,	&	Pascalis,	O.	(2007).	The	other-
race	 effect	 develops	 during	 infancy:	 Evidence	 of	 perceptual	
narrowing.	Psychological	Science,	18(12),	1084-1089.	
Kelly,	 D.	 J.,	 Liu,	 S.,	 Lee,	 K.,	 Quinn,	 P.	 C.,	 Pascalis,	 O.,	 Slater,	 A.	M.,	 &	 Ge,	 L.	 (2009).	
Development	 of	 the	 other-race	 effect	 during	 infancy:	 Evidence	 toward	
universality?.	Journal	of	experimental	child	psychology,	104(1),	105-114.	
Kennerknecht,	 I.,	 Grueter,	 T.,	 Welling,	 B.,	 Wentzek,	 S.,	 Horst,	 J.,	 Edwards,	 S.,	 &	
Grueter,	 M.	 (2006).	 First	 report	 of	 prevalence	 of	 non‐syndromic	 hereditary	
prosopagnosia	 (HPA).	 American	 Journal	 of	 Medical	 Genetics	 Part	 A,	 140(15),	
1617-1622.	
Kibbe,	M.	M.,	&	Leslie,	A.	M.	(2011).	What	do	infants	remember	when	they	forget?	
Location	 and	 identity	 in	 6-month-olds’	 memory	 for	 objects.	Psychological	
Science,	22(12),	1500-1505.	
Kleemans,	 T.,	 Peeters,	 M.,	 Segers,	 E.,	 &	 Verhoeven,	 L.	 (2012).	 Child	 and	 home	
predictors	 of	 early	 numeracy	 skills	 in	 kindergarten.	Early	Childhood	Research	
Quarterly,	27	(3),	471–477.			
Kovas,	Y.,	Haworth,	C.M.A.,	Dale,	P.S.,	Plomin,	R.,	Weinberg,	R.A.,	et	al.	 (2007).	The	
genetic	 and	 environmental	 origins	 of	 learning	 abilities	 and	 disabilities	 in	 the	
	
	 139	
early	 school	 years.	Monographs	 of	 the	 Society	 for	 Research	 in	 Child	 Develop-	
ment,	72	(3),	1–144.		
Kovas,	 Y.,	 &	 Plomin,	 R.	 (2006).	 Generalist	 genes:	 implications	 for	 the	 cognitive	
sciences.	Trends	in	cognitive	sciences,	10(5),	198-203.	
Landerl,	 K.	 (2013).	Development	 of	 numerical	 processing	 in	 children	with	 typical	
and	 dyscalculic	 arithmetic	 skills—a	 longitudinal	 study.	Frontiers	 in	
psychology,	4,	459.	
Landerl,	 K.,	 Bevan,	 A.,	 &	 Butterworth,	 B.	 (2004).	 Developmental	 dyscalculia	 and	
basic	 numerical	 capacities:	A	 study	 of	 8–9-year-old	 students.	Cognition,	93(2),	
99-125.	
Lefevre,	 J.A.,	Kwarchuk,	S.L.,	Smith-Chant,	B.L.,	Fast,	L.,	Kamawar,	D.,	 et	al.	 (2009).	
Home	 numeracy	 experiences	 and	 children’s	 math	 performance	 in	 the	 early	
school	years.	Canadian	Journal	of	Behavioural	Science,	41	(2),	55–66.		
LeFevre,	 J.,	 Polyzoi,	 E.,	 Skwarchuk,	 S.,	 Fast,	 L.,	 &	 Sowinski,	 C.	 (2010b).	 Do	 home	
numeracy	 and	 literacy	 practices	 of	 Greek	 and	 Canadian	 parents	 predict	 the	
numeracy	 skills	 of	 kindergarten	 children?	 International	 Journal	of	Early	Years	
Education,	18	(1),	55–70.		
Levine,	 S.C.,	 Suriyakham,	 L.W.,	 Rowe,	 M.L.,	 Huttenlocher,	 J.,	 &	 Gunderson,	 E.A.	
(2010).	 What	 counts	 in	 the	 development	 of	 young	 children’s	 number	
knowledge?	Developmental	Psychology,	46	(5),	1309–1319.		
Libertus,	M.	 E.,	 &	 Brannon,	 E.	M.	 (2010).	 Stable	 individual	 differences	 in	 number	
discrimination	in	infancy.	Developmental	science,	13(6),	900-906.	
Libertus,	 M.	 E.,	 Feigenson,	 L.,	 &	 Halberda,	 J.	 (2011).	 Preschool	 acuity	 of	 the		





with	 math	 scores	 on	 college-entrance	 examination.	Acta	 psychologica,	141(3),	
373-379.	
Libertus,	 M.	 E.,	 Feigenson,	 L.,	 &	 Halberda,	 J.	 (2013).	 Is	 approximate	 number	
precision	 a	 stable	 predictor	 of	 math	 ability?.	Learning	 and	 individual	
differences,	25,	126-133.	
Lipton,	 J.	 S.,	 &	 Spelke,	 E.	 S.	 (2003).	 Origins	 of	 number	 sense:	 Large-number	
discrimination	in	human	infants.	Psychological	science,	14(5),	396-401.	
Liu,	 S.,	 Quinn,	 P.	 C.,	Wheeler,	 A.,	 Xiao,	 N.,	 Ge,	 L.,	 &	 Lee,	 K.	 (2011).	 Similarity	 and	





Macchi	 Cassia,	 V.	 (2011).	Age	biases	 in	 face	processing:	The	 effects	 of	 experience	
across	development.	British	Journal	of	Psychology,	102(4),	816-829.	
Macchi	 Cassia,	 V.,	 Kuefner,	 D.,	 Picozzi,	M.,	 &	 Vescovo,	 E.	 (2009).	 Early	 experience	
predicts	 later	 plasticity	 for	 face	 processing:	 Evidence	 for	 the	 reactivation	 of	
dormant	effects.	Psychological	science,	20(7),	853-859.	
Macchi	 Cassia,	 V.,	 Pisacane,	 A.,	 &	 Gava,	 L.	 (2012).	 No	 own-age	 bias	 in	 3-year-old	
children:	 More	 evidence	 for	 the	 role	 of	 early	 experience	 in	 building	 face-
processing	biases.	Journal	of	Experimental	Child	Psychology,	113(3),	372-382.	
Macchi	Cassia,	V.,	Turati,	C.,	&	Schwarzer,	G.	(2011).	Sensitivity	to	spacing	changes	





heavy	 patterns	 explain	 newborns'	 face	 preference?.	Psychological	
Science,	15(6),	379-383.	
Maurer,	 D.,	 Le	 Grand,	 R.,	 &	Mondloch,	 C.	 J.	 (2002).	 The	many	 faces	 of	 configural	
processing.	Trends	in	cognitive	sciences,	6(6),	255-260.	
Mazzocco,	M.	M.,	Feigenson,	L.,	&	Halberda,	J.	(2011).	Preschoolers'	precision	of	the	
approximate	 number	 system	 predicts	 later	 school	 mathematics	
performance.	PLoS	one,	6(9),	e23749.	
Mazzocco,	 M.	 M.,	 Feigenson,	 L.,	 &	 Halberda,	 J.	 (2011).	 Impaired	 acuity	 of	 the	
approximate	 number	 system	 underlies	 mathematical	 learning	 disability	
(dyscalculia).	Child	development,	82(4),	1224-1237.	
McKone,	E.,	&	Boyer,	B.	L.	(2006).	Sensitivity	of	4-year-olds	to	featural	and	second-
order	 relational	 changes	 in	 face	 distinctiveness.	Journal	 of	 experimental	 child	
psychology,	94(2),	134-162.	
McKone,	 E.,	 Martini,	 P.,	 &	 Nakayama,	 K.	 (2001).	 Categorical	 perception	 of	 face	
identity	 in	 noise	 isolates	 configural	 processing.	Journal	 of	 Experimental	
Psychology:	Human	Perception	and	Performance,	27(3),	573-599.	
McLean,	J.	F.,	&	Hitch,	G.	J.	(1999).	Working	memory	impairments	in	children	with	









to	 Complex	 “Frontal	 Lobe”	 Tasks:	 A	 Latent	 Variable	 Analysis.	 Cognitive	
Psychology,	41(1),	49-100.			
Moeller,	 K.,	 Neuburger,	 S.,	 Kaufmann,	 L.,	 Landerl,	 K.,	 &	Nuerk,	H.	 C.	 (2009).	 Basic	
number	 processing	 deficits	 in	 developmental	 dyscalculia:	 Evidence	 from	 eye	
tracking.	Cognitive	development,	24(4),	371-386.	
Mondloch,	 C.	 J.,	 Le	 Grand,	 R.,	 &	 Maurer,	 D.	 (2002).	 Configural	 face	 processing	
develops	more	slowly	than	featural	face	processing.	Perception,	31(5),	553-566.	
Mondloch,	C.	J.,	Lewis,	T.	L.,	Budreau,	D.	R.,	Maurer,	D.,	Dannemiller,	J.	L.,	Stephens,	




Mussolin,	 C.,	 Mejias,	 S.,	 &	 Noël,	 M.	 (2010).	 Symbolic	 and	 nonsymbolic	 number	
comparison	in	children	with	and	without	dyscalculia.	Cognition,	115,	10–25.		





Nieder,	 A.,	 &	 Miller,	 E.	 K.	 (2003).	 Coding	 of	 cognitive	 magnitude:	 Compressed	
scaling	 of	 numerical	 information	 in	 the	 primate	 prefrontal	
cortex.	Neuron,	37(1),	149-157.	
Nosworthy,	N.,	Bugden,	S.,	Archibald,	L.,	Evans,	B.,	&	Ansari,	D.	(2013).	A	two-minute	
paper-and-pencil	 test	 of	 symbolic	 and	 nonsymbolic	 numerical	 magnitude	
	
	 143	
processing	 explains	 variability	 in	 primary	 school	 children's	 arithmetic	
competence.	PloS	one,	8(7),	e67918.	
Odic,	 D.,	 Hock,	 H.,	 &	 Halberda,	 J.	 (2014).	 Hysteresis	 affects	 approximate	 number	
discrimination	 in	 young	 children.	Journal	 of	 Experimental	 Psychology:	
General,	143(1),	255-265.	
Olsson,	L.,	Östergren,	R.,	&	Träff,	U.	(2016).	Developmental	dyscalculia:	A	deficit	in	
the	 approximate	 number	 system	 or	 an	 access	 deficit?.	Cognitive	
Development,	39,	154-167.	
Park,	 J.,	 &	 Brannon,	 E.	 M.	 (2013).	 Training	 the	 approximate	 number	 system	
improves	math	proficiency.	Psychological	science,	24(10),	2013-2019.	
Park,	 J.,	&	Brannon,	E.	M.	(2014).	 Improving	arithmetic	performance	with	number	
sense	 training:	 An	 investigation	 of	 underlying	 mechanism.	Cognition,	133(1),	
188-200.	
Park,	 J.,	 Bermudez,	 V.,	 Roberts,	 R.	 C.,	 &	 Brannon,	 E.	 M.	 (2016).	 Non-symbolic	












Pellicano,	 E.,	 Rhodes,	 G.,	 &	 Peters,	 M.	 (2006).	 Are	 preschoolers	 sensitive	 to	
configural	information	in	faces?	Developmental	Science,	9,	270–277.	
Piazza,	 M.	 (2010).	 Neurocognitive	 start-up	 tools	 for	 symbolic	 number	
representations.	Trends	in	Cognitive	Sciences,	12(14),	542-551.	
Piazza,	M.,	Facoetti,	A.,	Trussardi,	A.N.,	Berteletti,	I.,	Conte,	S.,	Lucangeli,	D.,	Dehaene,	









Proietti,	 V.,	 Laurence,	 S.,	 Matthews,	 C.	 M.,	 Zhou,	 X.,	 &	 Mondloch,	 C.	 J.	 (2018).	
Attending	 to	 identity	 cues	 reduces	 the	 own-age	 but	 not	 the	 own-race	
recognition	advantage.	Vision	research.	
Quinn,	P.	C.,	&	Tanaka,	 J.	W.	 (2009).	 Infants'	processing	of	 featural	 and	configural	
information	in	the	upper	and	lower	halves	of	the	face.	Infancy,	14(4),	474-487.	







human	 fetus	 preferentially	 engages	 with	 face-like	 visual	 stimuli.	Current	
Biology,	27(12),	1825-1828.	
Reigosa-Crespo,	 V.,	 González-Alemañy,	 E.,	 León,	 T.,	 Torres,	 R.,	 Mosquera,	 R.,	 &	
Valdés-Sosa,	 M.	 (2013).	 Numerical	 capacities	 as	 domain-specific	 predictors	











Ross-Sheehy,	 S.,	Oakes,	 L.	M.,	&	Luck,	 S.	 J.	 (2011).	 Exogenous	 attention	 influences	
visual	short-term	memory	in	infants.	Developmental	Science,	14(3),	490-501.	
Rousselle,	 L.,	 &	 Noël,	 M.	 P.	 (2007).	 Basic	 numerical	 skills	 in	 children	 with	
mathematics	 learning	 disabilities:	 A	 comparison	 of	 symbolic	 vs	 non-symbolic	
number	magnitude	processing.	Cognition,	102,	361–395.	
Rotzer,	S.,	Loenneker,	T.,	Kucian,	K.,	Martin,	E.,	Klaver,	P.,	&	Von	Aster,	M.	 (2009).	









Sasanguie,	 D.,	 Defever,	 E.,	 Maertens,	 B.,	 &	 Reynvoet,	 B.	 (2014).	 The	 approximate	
number	 system	 is	 not	 predictive	 for	 symbolic	 number	 processing	 in	
kindergarteners.	The	Quarterly	 Journal	of	Experimental	Psychology,	67(2),	 271-
280.	
Saxe,	 G.	 B.,	 Guberman,	 S.	 R.,	 Gearhart,	 M.,	 Gelman,	 R.,	 Massey,	 C.	 M.,	 &	 Rogoff,	 B.	





Schleifer,	 P.,	 &	 Landerl,	 K.	 (2011).	 Subitizing	 and	 counting	 in	 typical	 and	 atypical	
development.	Developmental	science,	14(2),	280-291.	
Schmalzl,	 L.,	 Palermo,	 R.,	 &	 Coltheart,	 M.	 (2008).	 Cognitive	 heterogeneity	 in	
genetically	 based	 prosopagnosia:	 A	 family	 study.	Journal	 of	
Neuropsychology,	2(1),	99-117.	
Schneider,	 M.,	 Beeres,	 K.,	 Coban,	 L.,	 Merz,	 S.,	 Susan	 Schmidt,	 S.,	 Stricker,	 J.,	 &	 De	
Smedt,	 B.	 (2017).	 Associations	 of	 non-symbolic	 and	 symbolic	 numerical	









Scott,	 L.	 S.,	 &	 Monesson,	 A.	 (2009).	 The	 origin	 of	 biases	 in	 face	
perception.	Psychological	Science,	20(6),	676-680.	
Scott,	 L.	 S.,	 &	 Monesson,	 A.	 (2010).	 Experience-dependent	 neural	 specialization	
during	infancy.	Neuropsychologia,	48(6),	1857-1861.	
Shakeshaft,	 N.	 G.,	 &	 Plomin,	 R.	 (2015).	 Genetic	 specificity	 of	 face	









Simpson,	 E.	 A.,	 Varga,	 K.,	 Frick,	 J.	 E.,	 &	 Fragaszy,	 D.	 (2011).	 Infants	 experience	
perceptual	narrowing	for	nonprimate	faces.	Infancy,	16(3),	318-328.	
Singarajah,	 A.,	 Chanley,	 J.,	 Gutierrez,	 Y.,	 Cordon,	 Y.,	 Nguyen,	 B.,	 Burakowski,	 L.,	 &	




Skagerlund,	 K.,	 &	 Träff,	 U.	 (2016).	 Number	 processing	 and	 heterogeneity	 of	
developmental	 dyscalculia:	 Subtypes	 with	 different	 cognitive	 profiles	 and	
deficits.	Journal	of	learning	disabilities,	49(1),	36-50.	











Surian,	 L.,	 &	 Caldi,	 S.	 (2010).	 Infants'	 individuation	 of	 agents	 and	 inert	
objects.	Developmental	Science,	13(1),	143-150.	
Szucs,	 D.,	 Devine,	 A.,	 Soltesz,	 F.,	 Nobes,	 A.,	 &	 Gabriel,	 F.	 (2013).	 Developmental	
dyscalculia	 is	 related	 to	 visuo-spatial	 memory	 and	 inhibition	
impairment.	Cortex,	49(10),	2674-2688.	
Thompson,	L.	A.,	Madrid,	V.,	Westbrook,	S.,	&	Johnston,	V.	(2001).	Infants	attend	to	
second-order	 relational	 properties	 of	 faces.	Psychonomic	 Bulletin	 &	
Review,	8(4),	769-777.	
Tosto,	 M.G.,	 Petrill,	 S.A.,	 Halberda,	 J.,	 Trzaskowski,	 M.,	 Tikhomirova,	 T.N.,	 et	 al.	




Träff,	 U.,	 Olsson,	 L.,	 Östergren,	 R.,	 &	 Skagerlund,	 K.	 (2017).	 Heterogeneity	 of	
developmental	 dyscalculia:	 cases	 with	 different	 deficit	 profiles.	Frontiers	 in	
psychology,	7,	2000.	
Trick,	 L.	 M.,	 &	 Pylyshyn,	 Z.	 W.	 (1994).	 Why	 are	 small	 and	 large	 numbers	
enumerated	 differently?	 A	 limited-capacity	 preattentive	 stage	 in	
vision.	Psychological	review,	101(1),	80-102.	
van	der	Sluis,	S.,	de	 Jong,	P.	F.,	&	van	der	Leij,	A.	(2004).	 Inhibition	and	shifting	 in	
children	 with	 learning	 deficits	 in	 arithmetic	 and	 reading.	 Journal	 of	
experimental	child	psychology,	87(3),	239-266.	
vanMarle,	 K.,	 Chu,	 F.	 W.,	 Mou,	 Y.,	 Seok,	 J.	 H.,	 Rouder,	 J.,	 &	 Geary,	 D.	 C.	 (2018).	
Attaching	meaning	 to	 the	number	words:	Contributions	of	 the	object	 tracking	
and	approximate	number	systems.	Developmental	science,	21(1),	e12495.	
Valenza,	 E.,	 Simion,	 F.,	 Cassia,	 V.	 M.,	 &	 Umiltà,	 C.	 (1996).	 Face	 preference	 at	




Wang,	 J.	 J.,	Odic,	D.,	Halberda,	 J.,	&	Feigenson,	L.	 (2016).	Changing	the	precision	of	
preschoolers’	 approximate	 number	 system	 representations	 changes	 their	
symbolic	math	performance.	Journal	of	Experimental	Child	Psychology,	147,	82-
99.	





Wang,	 J.	 J.,	 Libertus,	M.	 E.,	 &	 Feigenson,	 L.	 (2018).	Hysteresis-induced	 changes	 in	
preverbal	 infants’	 approximate	 number	 precision.	Cognitive	 Development,	47,	
107-116.	
Wagner,	 J.	 B.,	 &	 Johnson,	 S.	 C.	 (2011).	 An	 association	 between	 understanding	
cardinality	 and	 analog	 magnitude	 representations	 in	
preschoolers.	Cognition,	119(1),	10-22.	
Wechsler,	 D.	 (1991).	WISC-III:	 Wechsler	 intelligence	 scale	 for	 children:	 Manual.	
Psychological	Corporation.	
Wilcox,	 T.,	 &	 Biondi,	 M.	 (2015).	 Object	 processing	 in	 the	 infant:	 lessons	 from	
neuroscience.	Trends	in	cognitive	sciences,	19(7),	406-413.	




Wilson,	 A.	 J.,	 &	 Dehaene,	 S.	 (2007).	 Number	 sense	 and	 developmental	
dyscalculia.	Human	 behavior,	 learning,	 and	 the	 developing	 brain:	 Atypical	
development,	2,	212-237.	









Xu,	 F.,	 &	 Carey,	 S.	 (1996).	 Infants’	 metaphysics:	 The	 case	 of	 numerical	 identity.	
Cognitive	psychology,	30(2),	111-153.	
Xu,	 F.,	 Cote,	 M.,	 &	 Baker,	 A.	 (2005).	 Labeling	 guides	 object	 individuation	 in	 12-
month-old	infants.	Psychological	Science,	16(5),	372-377.	
Xu,	 F.,	 &	 Spelke,	 E.	 S.	 (2000).	 Large	 number	 discrimination	 in	 6-month-old	
infants.	Cognition,	74(1),	B1-B11.	
Xu,	 F.,	 Spelke,	 E.	 S.,	 &	 Goddard,	 S.	 (2005).	 Number	 sense	 in	 human	 infants.	
Developmental	science,	8(1),	88-101.	
Zhu,	Q.,	 Song,	 Y.,	Hu,	 S.,	 Li,	 X.,	 Tian,	M.,	 Zhen,	 Z.,	 Dong,	Q.,	 Kanwisher,	N.,	&	 Liu,	 J.	
(2010).	Heritability	of	 the	specific	cognitive	ability	of	 face	perception.	Current	
Biology,	20(2),	137-142.		
Zorzi,	 M.,	 Stoianov,	 I.,	 &	 Umiltà,	 C.(2005).	 Computational	 modeling	 of	 numerical	
cognition.	Handbook	of	mathematical	cognition,	67-84.	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
